OMAHA BEACHHEAD (6 June-13 June 1944) American Forces in Action Series Historical Division War Department Facsimile Reprint, 1984 CMH Pub 100-11 Center of Military History United States Army Washington, D.C. (For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20492 (Uploaded by Larry W. Jewell, jewell@mace.cc.purdue.edu) Foreword In the thick of battle, the soldier is busy doing his job. He had the knowledge and confidence that his job is part of a unified plan to defeat the enemy, but he does not have time to survey a campaign from a fox hole. If he should be wounded and removed behind the lines, he may have even less opportunity to learn what place he and his unit had in the larger fight. AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION is a series prepared by the War Department especially for the information of wounded men. It will show these soldiers, who have served their country so well, the part they and their comrades played in achievement which do honor to the record of the United States Army. G. C. Marshall, Chief of Staff. WAR DEPARTMENT Historical Division Washington 25, D.C. 20 September 1945 OMAHA BEACHHEAD, seventh of a series call AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION, is the first of a number of narratives dealing with U.S. military operations in France. UTAH BEACH TO CHERBOURG, planned for later publication, will round out the account of the invasion at corps level and below. Larger phases of the NEPTUNE operation, including high-level planning, naval operations, and the action of British units, are treated here only in outline. OMAHA BEACHHEAD was prepared in the field by the 2d Information and Historical Service, attached to First Army, and by the Historical Section, European Theater of Operations. Although as published this book contains no documentation, the original manuscript, fully documented, is on file in the War Department. It is based on complete unit reports and records, on interviews, and on available enemy records. Some unit records for the period concerned are inadequate, and despite all care used in research and assembly of the materials, it is recognized that the information is not complete in all details and may involve minor errors of fact. Before a final official history of the campaign in France is prepared, the gaps should be filled and the errors corrected. This can be done only if individuals who possess additional information will furnish it to the War Department. Readers are therefore urged to send directly to the Historical Division, War Department, Washington, 25, D.C., all comments, criticisms, and additional data which may help in the preparation of a complete and definitive history of this operation. CONTENTS OPERATION NEPTUNE.....................................................1 Navy and Air Forces...................................................2 21 Army Group.........................................................3 V Corps Planning......................................................6 ASSAULT PLAN..........................................................8 Terrain..............................................................10 Enemy Defenses.......................................................20 Pre-Assault Bombardment Plans........................................28 Plan of Assault Landings.............................................30 Plan for Movement to Inland Objectives...............................33 D DAY: THE LANDINGS..................................................35 Approach to the Beach................................................38 The Initial Assault Wave.............................................42 The Later Assault Waves: 116th RCT...................................49 The Later Assault Waves: 16th RCT....................................53 Conditions on the Beach: 0730-0800...................................54 ASSAULT OF THE BLUFFS................................................58 The Advance from Dog White...........................................59 The Advance between D-3 and E-1 Draws................................63 The Advance from Easy Red............................................65 The Advance from Fox Green...........................................73 Other Assault Actions................................................75 The Beach: 0800-1200.................................................79 Landings of Reinforcements on Easy Red...............................82 The Rangers at Pointe du Hoe.........................................87 ADVANCE INLAND.......................................................92 Vierville Area.......................................................93 St-Laurent Area......................................................97 Colleville Area......................................................98 Afternoon on the Beach..............................................101 At the End of D Day.................................................107 The Enemy Side......................................................112 ATTAINMENT OF D-DAY OBJECTIVES (7-8 JUNE)...........................116 Trevieres-Tour-en-Bessin (1st Division).............................116 Grandcamp-Isigny Area (29th Division)...............................122 Improvement at the Beach............................................131 The Enemy Side......................................................134 THE ATTACK OF 9-11 JUNE.............................................136 Advance to Cerisy Forest (1st and 2nd Division).....................138 Across the Lower Aure (29th Division)...............................143 The Enemy Side......................................................147 THE ATTACK OF 12-13 JUNE............................................150 Advance to Caumont..................................................151 Crossing the Elle River.............................................153 Action West of the Vire.............................................157 The Enemy Side......................................................159 CONCLUSION..........................................................163 ANNEX NO. 1: Unit Citations.........................................164 ANNEX NO. 2: Abbreviations..........................................165 (Information on Photos and Maps not included in etext version.) Page 1 OPERATION NEPTUNE TWO YEARS of planning and preparation led up to the Allied landings in Normandy on 6 June 1944. British and American staffs had to work out every foreseeable detail for an undertaking that would involve the major military resources of the two Allied powers; immense stocks of shipping, aircraft, and supplies were assembled in the British Isles in an effort that taxed the war industries of both countries; before D Day the Allied air forces had carried out several months of bombing operations which were an integral part of the invasion itself. The first decisions were strategic in the broadest sense, since the opening of a front in Western Europe had to be considered in reference to over-all Allied plans for offensive operations against Germany, as well as the developments of the war in Russia and of the war against Japan. In May 1943 the Anglo-American conference in Washington concluded this stage of strategic planning; Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt together with their highest military advisers decided to launch an offensive in 1944 against Hitler's Atlantic Wall. Allied planners, after weighing all the possibilities, finally selected 50 miles of coast in western Normandy, from the Vire Estuary to the Orne, as the assault area for securing a lodgement. This area was near good, relatively undamaged ports in southern and southwestern England, and was in range of fighter planes operating from English bases; the major French ports of Cherbourg and le Havre were within striking distance; and air attacks on railways and river bridges might be able to isolate the region behind the assault area from the main enemy centers of supply and reinforcement to the east. In comparison with the stretch of coast northeast of the Seine (Pas-de-Calais), along the narrowest part of the English Channel, western Normandy was somewhat further from English bases but was not as heavily fortified. At the Quebec Conference in August 1943 Allied leaders approved the choice of this battleground for invasion. The staffs of ground forces, air forces, and navies had now entered the second stage of planning for the largest amphibious operation in military history. The tactical difficulties to be faced were only one part of a problem that required complete coordination and teamwork, not merely between the military forces of two nations but also between all arms of those forces. Planning necessarily included preparation for operations over an extended period of time, and had to cover far more than the initial task of securing beachheads. In some respects the critical factor was the Allies' ability to reinforce and supply the assault rapidly enough both to meet enemy counterattacks and to prepare for a larger Allied offensive beyond the landing area. The Allied navies and services of supply had to solve logistical problems on which would depend the fate of the whole undertaking. Page 2 In this phase of planning, as main policies were worked out in ever more complex detail by staffs of subordinate commands, the work was coordinated under the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command, Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E. Morgan. In his organization, British and American officers of all the services worked side by side in shaping their joint enterprise. The fusion of Allied planning staffs under a single command involved a principle which was carried into the command organization for the operation itself. On 21 January 1944 Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, called from the North African Theater of Operations, had his first meeting with the high Allied planning staff in England. He took formal command at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, on 13 February. Planning now approached the final stage. The approximate target date (Y Day) had been set as 31 May, after earlier designation as 1 May; the postponement was made in order to obtain a larger supply of assault craft and to give more time for the preliminary air operations to produce their desired effect. By February, the staffs of higher commands had finished their plans, which would determine the major outline of the assault, and the plans of lower echelons were nearing completion. What remained was the difficult task of shaping last details, with due regard to ever increasing intelligence of enemy defenses and to the experience gained in training exercises. Final loading plans, among the most complex features of the whole operation, were subject to change as late as May because of uncertainties as to the number of ships and craft available. Services of Supply, commanded by Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, was completing its program of mounting the supplies for an operation which has been described as “an assault of materiel, operated by man.” Planning for this aspect of the invasion had begun in April 1942, and along with it went the work of preparing facilities and assembling stores, work which was interrupted by the need to furnish 50,000 tons of cargo for the invasion of North Africa in November 1942. By June 1944 the number of United States troops in the United Kingdom had risen to 1,526,965, half of them arriving after the end of 1943. The stock pile for invasion-over and above basic loads and equipment-was 2,500,000 tons. In the process of mounting the assaults, 1,200 troop concentration camps and 100 marshaling camps had to be set up and operated, and 144,000 tons of supplies were preloaded, waiting for D Day. Navy and Air Forces Allied naval forces in the NEPTUNE operation, commanded by Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, faced a task of primary importance. They had to convey the ground forces to the area for assault on a hostile and defended shore, assist their landings by gunfire support, protect their lines of communication against enemy surface and underwater attack, and insure the flow of supplies for an indefinite period of future operations. Some 4,100 ships and craft of all types were involved in the assault, including major units of both British and American fleets. The Allied air forces, under command of Air Chief Marshal Sir Traford L. Leigh-Mallory, were assigned a complex role both defensive and offensive in character. They would protect the huge assault convoy at every stage on its approach to Normandy and throughout the battle for the beaches. Offensively, they had the mission of assisting the operation by landings of airborne troops, by air bombardment of coastal defenses, and by attacks on enemy lines of reinforcement and supply. Page 3 In a very real sense, the invasion began with air force operations that had commenced long before D Day. From the summer of 1943 to the following spring, the U. S. Eighth Air Force had concentrated its attacks on German aircraft industries and airfields, with the primary purpose of preventing the enemy from increasing his strength in the air. Both by destruction of factories and of enemy planes met in combat this program was successful, and its success counted in the invasion. In addition to losing between 5,000 and 6,000 planes in the period, the enemy was unable to enlarge his first-line force in preparation for the expected assault. In April and May 1944, while continuing attacks on Germany often enough to force concentration of enemy air strength in that area, the heavy bombers entered on a phase of operations directly related to the impending assault. This was a series of heavy attacks on marshaling yards and airfields in France, the Low Countries, and western Germany, over an area large enough to preclude any indication of the precise invasion area. The attack on marshaling yards was designed to paralyze repair and maintenance facilities, thus wearing down the capacity of railways for movement of troops and supplies and forcing the enemy to maximum use of road transport. During May the range of air attacks was gradually narrowed, coming to a climax in the three days preceding D Day. However, even in this period of final blows against rail junctions and airfields a majority of the targets were along the Channel coast east of the Seine. Ninth Air Force medium bombers and fighter-bombers had also shared in the preparatory phases of the campaign. Beginning in April and continuing with increased vigor in May, they delivered attacks on enemy airfields in northern France, with the aim of ultimately neutralizing all fields within 130 miles of the assault beaches. During May, 36 airfields from Brittany to Holland received one or more attacks. Marshaling yards were also a target of medium bombers; between 1 March and 5 June, 36 yards in Belgium and northern France were hit in a total of 139 attacks. Results were excellent. The important yard at Creil, near Paris, was estimated as 60 percent out of commission on 24 May. Late in that month, rail bridges on the Seine and the Meuse Rivers were given first priority. By 4 June, all rail bridges (10) between Rouen and Conflans, inclusive, were knocked out, and all but 1 of the 14 road bridges. Fighter-bomber attacks on enemy rolling stock during May inflicted considerable damage. On 21 May, in the most active day for this type of work, 500 aircraft claimed results of 46 locomotives destroyed and 32 damaged, and damage to 30 trains. The Ninth Air Force was also busy on reconnaissance missions, which included heavy activity north of the Somme River as well as in the invasion area. Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force switched the main effort of its attacks during May from Germany to France and the Low Countries. Of 37,250 tons dropped during the month, 28,703 were directed at targets which were chosen as part of the “softening-up” program leading to the invasion. 21 Army Group The ground forces in the Normandy operation were led by Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, commanding 21 Army Group. His troops would assault in three main areas (Map No. 1) [1] with initial strength of six reinforced infantry divisions landing from the sea and of three airborne divisions. [1] Maps numbered in roman are bound in sequence on the inside of the back cover Page 4 (Map No. 1) Page 5 On the left the Second British Army would attack with three divisions (two of I Corps, one of XXX Corps) on three landing beaches. A brigade of the 6 British Airborne Division was to be dropped behind the beach defenses to secure vital bridges over the Orne River, between Caen and the sea. The objectives for D Day of the Second British Army included Bayeux, Caen, and Cabourg. The First U. S. Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, was responsible for the other two assault areas. VII Corps (Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, commanding) would land one division just north of the Vire Estuary (Beach “Utah”). In the early morning hours of D Day, four to five hours before the assault from sea, the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions were scheduled to be dropped in the area southeast and west of Ste-Mere-Eglise, where their mission was to capture the crossings of the Merderet River, secure the line of the Douve River as a barrier to the south, and assist the landings at Utah Beach. At the end of D Day, VII Corps should control the area east of the Merderet from just south of Montebourg to the Douve. Between the other assault areas, V Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow planned its attack on a 7,000-yard stretch of beach to be known as “Omaha.” [2] The scheme and objectives of this assault will be described later in detail. General Montgomery's intention after the initial beachheads were secured, was to hold in the area south and east of Caen while the First U. S. Army meantime maneuvered to cut of the Cotentin peninsula and capture Cherbourg. This port, to be opened as a major supply channel for further operations, was to be taken by D+15. The First Army, reinforced to a strength of three corps, was then to attack south toward Coutances and the base of the Brittany peninsula. Tentative phase lines allowed for capture of the Cerisy Forest area by D+5 or 6; St-Lo and Caumont by D+9. These phase lines were set with the most favorable possible development of the operation in mind. They insured readiness for maximum progress but represented neither a hard-and-fast schedule nor an optimistic forecast. Enemy strength in France and the Low Countries (Map No. 1) was estimated at 60 divisions, having been built up from 53 since February 1944. Of these, 17 were infantry divisions, 26 were characterized as “limited employment” units (coastal defense units of limited mobility), 7 were training units, and 10 were panzer or panzer grenadier divisions. The armored divisions were located at inland points whence they could be moved as striking forces into a threatened coastal area. As a possible indication of where the German high command expected the assault, no fewer than 22 divisions guarded the region from the Seine to Holland. The sector in which the blow was actually to fall came under the German Seventh Army, commanded by Col. Gen. Friedrich Dollmann with headquarters at le Mans in Normandy. LXXXIV Corps was responsible for the defense of the French coast from the Orne River to the northeast corner of Brittany. At the end of the winter the enemy force in or very near the assault area was estimated at only five infantry divisions, plus minor ground force elements. During May, Allied intelligence found evidence of reinforcement by two infantry divisions and (just south of Caen) the 21st Panzer Division. As a mobile reserve, two panzer divisions had come into the Alencon-Evreux region, from which they could reach the assault area quickly. A number of the enemy units in Brittany would also be available as reinforcement within a few days, and (depend- [2] From “O” Force, assigned to the area. Page 6 ing on the success of Allied air attacks) divisions from north of the Seine and south of the Loire could be brought to Normandy. Allied estimates of enemy build-up, assuming no interference to his road and rail movement, fixed his maximum possible strength in the assault area at 18 to 20 divisions, including 8 armored, by D+3. At this same date Allied forces ashore were scheduled to number 13 divisions, including elements of 2 armored divisions. [3] The success of the invasion would depend in considerable measure on the outcome of a race between Allied build-up and enemy reinforcement, in which it was hoped that the operations of the Allied air forces against rail and road communications would impose a decisive handicap on the Germans. V Corps Planning As the highest U. S. Army field-force headquarters then in Britain, V Corps Headquarters began in July 1943 to share in the early planning for employment of American forces in assault on the continent. On 12 September, by directive of the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Headquarters, V Corps' work was focused on the specific problem of an assault landing in Normandy. By October the headquarters of First U. S. Army and U. S. 1st Army Group were established in Britain. Since the decisions taken at higher levels determined the mission and objectives of subordinate units, the work had to be done concurrently and with constant interchange of views between the different levels of command and between the different services. The final plans for ground forces were produced in a series from January to May, beginning with 21 Army Group. First Army NEPTUNE Plan was issued on 25 February, V Corps' plan on 26 March, and that of the 1st Infantry Division on 16 April. No final decisions on troop lists and loading were possible until even later dates, and revisions of detail in many parts of the plans were necessary as late as the end of May. A special planning group, headed by Col. Benjamin B. Talley, had been put in charge of shaping the V Corps NEPTUNE Plan. As the First Army and V Corps planning groups proceeded in their work, they felt the necessity of practical experiment with the problems involved in an amphibious operation on the scale proposed, particularly those of mounting and loading assault troops. A training center at Ilfracombe, northwest Devonshire, for study of assault techniques had been in use since 1942, and experiments on methods of loading and landing had been conducted near Dartmouth since September 1943 with cooperation of the British Navy. In December a stretch of coast at Slapton Sands (South Devonshire) was provided by the British Government as an assault training area for American forces. Here the conditions of tide, beach, and terrain were roughly similar to those on the Normandy coast, and the area was large enough to permit large-scale exercises and the use of live fire including naval and air bombardment. From January on, this training ground was used for every type of experiment and for exercises involving naval, air force, and service force units as well as the assault infantry and tanks. In addition to its training value, the work done here was of direct influence on the planning, particularly in the case of exercises conducted on a scale large enough to embrace major units. Exercise “Duck,” held in January, involved a division plus corps troops and took in all the stages of assault from concentration and marshaling to a landing after air bombardment and naval fire. From this exercise it was learned that three divisions could be mounted from the Plymouth- Portland-Falmouth-Dart- [3] Also several British and U. S. tank units attached to infantry divisions or employed as corps troops. Page 7 mouth port areas, instead of one as previously supposed. In March, Exercise “Fox” was staged at corps level and involved two divisions. From 3 to 8 May, “Fabius I” concluded the series of larger exercises with what amounted to a dress rehearsal for the NEPTUNE operation. The troops used a scheme of maneuver closely similar to that of the NEPTUNE plans, and the concentration and embarkation took place in areas soon to be used for NEPTUNE mounting. Throughout these months, training and planning went hand in hand, and the Planning Group used lessons learned at Slapton Sands in its final adjustments and revision of details. V Corps NEPTUNE Plan, consisting of an operations plan proper and 22 annexes (practically all of these completed by revisions in April or May), totaled 326 legal-size pages with 23 maps and charts. Page 8 ASSAULT PLAN THE MISSION OF V CORPS was to secure a beachhead in the area between Port-en-Bessin and the Vire River, from which they would push southward toward Caumont and St-Lo, conforming with the advance of the British Second Army. The Corps would arrive at the beachhead in four stages. The initial assault force (Force “O”) consisted of the 1st Division, reinforced to include four infantry regiments with strong attachments of artillery, armor, and engineers, as well as attachments of engineer and service units for movement to the beach. Chief components of the 1st Division were its own 16th and 18th Regimental Combat Teams, the 116th Regimental Combat Team and the 115th Infantry attached from the 29th Division, and the Provisional Ranger Force of two battalions (2d and 5th). Force “O” numbered 34,142 men and 3,306 vehicles. The follow-up force (Force “B”) was scheduled to arrive off the assault beach after noon on D Day and numbered 25,117 men and 4,429 vehicles. It included the 29th Division, consisting of the 175th Infantry and (attached from the 1st Division) the 26th RCT. Scheduled to arrive on D+1 and D+2, the preloaded build-up contingent had as main component the 2d Division and Page 9 totaled some 17,500 men and 2,300 vehicles. Schedules for the later build-up completing the transfer of V Corps to Normandy, called for the arrival between D+2 and D+15 of 27 residual groups involving 32,000 troops and 9,446 vehicles. All of these totals included a large number of units attached to V Corps for movement only. The loading plans of Force “O" and Force "B” were designed to fit an operation which would develop from an assault by one reinforced division into attack by two divisions abreast. Unity of command in the critical first stages would thus be assured. Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, commanding the 1st Division, would conduct the initial assault with a force that included two units of the 29th Division, and plans for the landings and for movement inland Page 10 were made so as to permit the early assignment of divisional zones to the 1st and 29th Divisions. These zones would go into effect on corps order, when Maj. Gen. Charles H. Gerhardt would assume command of the 29th Division with its normal components. In the meantime, in order to pave the way for this step, Brig. Gen. Norman D. Cota, assistant divisional commander of the 29th, was to land with the 116th RCT and assist General Huebner in handling the 29th Division units until they reverted. The 1st Division was a veteran unit which had served through the campaigns of North Africa and Sicily. The 29th and 2d Divisions would experience their first action in Normandy. Terrain The coast of Normandy offers only a few areas favorable for large-scale landing operations in the one assigned to V Corps (Maps Nos. II and III). Cliffs, reefs, and the wide tidal ranges combine to present Page 11 natural difficulties. The estuary at the mouth of the Vire River is marked by extensive shallows, exposed at low tide, and flanked on the east by reefs that extend to Grandcamp. Beyond that seaside village cliffs averaging 100 feet in height tower above a narrow beach as far as Pointe de la Percee. Five miles further east, cliffs reappear at the shore line, and the beach is spoiled by rock ledges which continue as far as Port-en-Bessin. It was on this five-mile, cliffless interval that V Corps planned its assault landings, designating the sector as “Omaha” Beach. That part of the stretch regarded as suitable for landing operations was about 7,000 yards long, on a shore which curves landward in a very slight crescent and is backed with bluffs which merge into the cliffs at either end of the sector. The beach slopes very gently below highwater mark. With a tidal range of 18 feet expected at the period of the assault, low tide would expose a stretch of firm sand averaging about 300 yards in distance from low- water mark to high. The enemy had placed “underwater” obstacles on this tidal flat. At high tide, men and vehicles wading Page 12 up the beach could expect trouble with irregular runnels parallel to the shore, scoured out by the tidal current and two and one-half to four feet deep. At the high-water mark, the tidal flat terminated [4] in a bank of coarse shingle, sloping up rather steeply to a height of some 8 feet. In places it was as much as 15 yards wide, and the stones averaged 3 inches in diameter. On the eastern two-thirds of the beach, the shingle lay against a low sand embankment or dune line and constituted a barrier which was impassable for vehicles. On the western part of the beach the shingle piled against a sea wall, first (near the Vierville exit, D-1) of stone masonry sloping seaward, then of wood. The wall varied in height from 4 to 12 feet and was broken by a gap several hundred yards wide where the tidal flat ended in shingle and embankment. Immediately behind the sea wall a paved, [4] As a result of defensive preparations by the Germans, the effects of the assault bombardment, and (above all) the work done by engineers to clear the beach for supply operations after the assault, many features of the beach at the time of the assault were largely destroyed. The sea wall and shingle embankment were completely removed, and many of the beach villas were razed or reduced to rubble. The road system was entirely changed. Page 13 promenade beach road ran from Exit D-1 to Exit D-3, then became a rough track going as far as Exit E-3. Between the dune line (or sea wall) and the bluffs lay the beach flat. Very narrow at either end of the main landing one, this level shelf of sand widened to more than 200 yards near the center of the stretch. Except at the Vierville end, the flat had large patches of marsh and high grass, usually near the edge of the bluffs. Toward Exit D-1, a number of summer villas lined the shelf behind the promenade road, and at Exit D-3 lay a small village, les Moulins, with buildings clustered on the road running back inland from the beach. Many of these had been razed by the Germans to improve fields of defensive fires. East of les Moulins there were only a few scattered houses. Bluffs 100 to 170 feet in height rise sharply from the flat and dominate the whole beach area. The slopes are generally steep, but in varying degree. They are most abrupt between Exit D-1 and Exit D-3; farther east, the rise is easier but reaches higher elevations (150 to 165 feet) fairly close to the beach flat. The grass-covered slopes are more uneven than they appear when viewed from only a short distance. Many small folds or irregularities provide opportunity for cover from flanking fires, and from Exit E-1 eastward the bluff sides are partly covered with low scrub and brush. Along most of the stretch, the bluff ends in a clear-cut crest line as it reaches the edge of the inland plateau; toward the eastern end, where the slopes are longer and more gradual, the edge is not sharply defined. Page 14 & 15 (Photos) Page 16 At four points along Omaha Beach small wooded valleys slope back inland and provide natural corridors for exit from the beach flat. A paved road led off the coast at Exit D-1; the other draws had unimproved roads. These corridors were, inevitably, key areas both in the plan of attack and in the arrangement of defenses. The advance inland of assaulting units would depend on opening exit roads for traffic and supply from the beach, and armor used in the attack could only get up to the high ground through the draws. Near the eastern end of the beach a very shallow and fairly steep draw, followed by a rough trail leading inland, was marked for development as a fifth exit route (F-1). Once up the steep slopes bordering the beach, attacking troops would get the impression of coming out on a gently rolling plain. Actually, there is a gradual rise to a height of land which parallels the coast about 2,000 yards inland and reaches over 250 feet in altitude south of Colleville. There is no marked “ridge” line whatever, and except for unusually open fields near the bluff between Exits D-1 and E-1, observation in the whole area is severely limited by the numerous hedgerows, orchards, and patches of trees. Three villages, Vierville, St-Laurent, and Colleville, [5] 500 to 1,000 yards inland, were so situated near the heads of draws and along the coastal highway as to figure inevitably in the defense of main exit routes. These were farming villages, with a certain amount of activity in summer as modest beach resorts. Their stone houses were clustered on or near the coastal highway that connected them with Grandcamp and Bayeux. South of the tableland lies the valley of the Aure River, running from east to west, flowing about two miles behind the beach at Port-en-Bessin and five miles south of it at Pointe de la Percee (Map No. III). West of Trevieres the valley plain had been flooded to form a barrier over a mile wide. Above the Trevieres the Aure was fordable by infantry. Only on the northern side of the valley are the slopes at all pronounced; at two points (just north of Trevieres and at Mount Cauvin) the ground close to the river on the north is 150 to 200 feet above the stream, giving good observation into the valley and its main approaches from the south. South of the Aure the ground rises again, at first very gradually, toward the height of land crowned by Cerisy Forest, 12 miles south of the coast and nearly 400 feet above sea level. Several small streams flowing north toward the Aure divide this rising ground into a series of low north-south ridges. In V Corps' estimates for the operation the Cerisy Forest figured as an important tactical objective, necessary to hold if the beachhead was to be secure. It not only included commanding ground, within medium artillery range of the coast, but offered cover for assembly of enemy forces. The region west and southwest of Omaha Beach figured prominently in D- Day plans, for early junction with VII Corps depended on progress in that direction. The flooding of the lower Aure Valley had nearly made a peninsula, 10 miles long and 5 miles wide, comprising the low tableland stretching from Formigny-Trevieres west to the Vire Estuary. In it lay some of the strongest German fortifications, controlling the sea approaches to Carentan, and through it from east to west ran the principal highway from Paris (Caen) to Cherbourg and the Cotentin. The town of Isigny, where the highway crossed the Aure, would be a key point in any effort to link the beachheads of V and VII Corps; all east-west communications near the coast funneled through Isigny, and [5] All three have compound names, with the ending "-sur-Mer." For convenience, and. since there is no danger of confusion with other localities, these endings are omitted. Page 17 from it V Corps could debouch on the lowlands near Carentan. The road net south and west of Omaha is characterized by the absence of main north-south routes; the few major highways in the corps one would be laterals rather than axials. The most important artery is the Carentan-Isigny-Bayeux road just noted. Another highway, well paved for two-way traffic, links Bayeux with the junction point of St-Lo, crossing the Cerisy Forest. From Port-en-Bessin to Grandcamp runs a 15-foot, hard-surface road paralleling the coast about a mile inland. North-south roads in the region, at best secondary, are winding and usually narrow; they were expected to present difficulties in the form of steep shoulders and narrow bridges. Local communications are served by many small lanes and tracks, designed for the needs of farmers, but regarded as unsuitable for military use except by infantry. Any advance inland would require, for the supporting vehicular traffic, a great deal of engineering work to develop small roads into suitable north-south axials. Deployment from any of the roads was estimated as likely to be difficult because of the ever present hedges, often combined with embankments. The double-track railroad from Paris (Caen) to Cherbourg runs from east to west across the high ground a few miles south of the Aure. Cutting this line at Bayeux and Caen, and denying its use to the enemy, was a primary objective in the D-Day attack of the British Second Army. Page 18 (Photo) Page 19 American troops who fought in Normandy will always connect the name with hedgerow fighting. They were to begin it as soon as they left the bluffs above Omaha Beach. Stock raising and fruit growing are the main rural activities in this part of Normandy, and the field system is characterized by a patchwork layout of irregular fields varying from narrow ribbon-like strips to shapes more nearly square. These range in size from 10 or 15 to a 100 acres or more, with the greater number probably averaging between 50 and 75 acres. Some contain orchards of low-growing apple trees, more are used for pasture, and there are occasional patches of grain, though the main wheat-growing area of western Normandy is in the Orne Valley. Boundaries between fields tend to follow NNE-SSW and WNW-ESE axes in the Omaha region, but local variations are numerous, and the boundaries could never be counted on to provide a safe direction-line for keeping to an axis of advance. Hedgerows form the universal substitute for fences in this country and vary in character almost as much as do the shapes of the fields. Some are low bushes, five to six feet high, growing from the ground level of the field and not hard to break through. Others are thick, densely matted walls of tough and briery hedge, running up to 10 feet in height and interspersed with large and small trees. In many regions (not so often in the area just behind Omaha Beach) the hedges grow out of banks or dikes of earth, forming natural ramparts sometimes six feet high and adding immensely to the strength of the barrier. Many hedge embankments are not passable for tanks. Drainage ditches are often found skirting the hedge or its embankment, and provide good sites for shelters and fox holes. Communication between fields is usually limited to small openings at the corners. Occasional narrow trails or sunken roads, running between parallel hedgerows (and not always shown on maps) give access to fields far off the regular road net. Fighting in country of this sort presents serious difficulties to attacking forces. Each hedgerow across the axis of advance might conceal a nest of enemy resistance, in which good positions for flat-trajectory weapons could be quickly organized, with short but usually excellent fields of fire across the nearest fields. Axial hedgerows could be utilized by defenders for delivering flanking fire. Observation would be extremely difficult for the attackers (see illustration, p. 120), and this might hinder the quick use of supporting heavy weapons and artillery fire. In contrast, a defending force could use prearranged fires of mortars and automatic weapons sited to cover the hedgerows leading toward any prepared positions. Split up by hedgerow walls, attacking forces were often to find difficulty in maintaining communications on their flanks and in coordinating the attack of units larger than a company. Fighting in this country would put a premium on initiative and aggressive leadership in small units, and armor could have only limited use. Trevieres, largest village in the area close to Omaha Beach, had a prewar population of about 800, and the total population of the region shown on Map No. III (excluding Bayeux) was probably under 10,000. Following practices that go back to Celtic settlement of the land, farmers in this part of Normandy tend to group in small straggling villages and hamlets, with houses of stone and rubble-mortar construction. If located on important roads or high ground, these villages were often destined to become centers of local resistance and to suffer accordingly. In terrain so lacking in hills, church towers were inevitably regarded as possible observation posts, and their ruins testify to the results of neutralizing artillery fire. The occasional isolated farms usually Page 20 consisted of fairly substantial buildings grouped around a court yard; many farms of this type became strongpoints in the battles through hedgerow country. Enemy Defenses In the years which followed the fall of France, the Germans publicized the building of an “Atlantic Wall” against any invasion attempts on the part of the Allies. In his speech announcing declaration of war on the United States, Hitler said (11 December 1941): “A belt of strongpoints and gigantic fortifications runs from Kirkenes (Norway) to the Pyrenees.... It is my unshakable decision to make this front impregnable against every enemy." Commando forays on the coast of France, aerial reconnaissance, and reports from the French Resistance and secret agents helped Allied Headquarters to amass detailed information on the enemy's progress in strengthening his fortifications in the west. On the basis of this intelligence Allied plans were checked and revised up to the middle of May. The estimates were later found to be substantially correct regarding enemy fire power, the underwater and beach obstacles, the plans for use of terrain in defense, and the strength of defensive emplacements German coastal defenses in the V Corps one were distributed in accordance with the degree of opportunity offered by different sectors for a landing assault (Maps Nos. II and IV) Thirty-two fortified areas or strongpoints were located between the Vire River and Port-en-Bessin. The Vire Estuary, Grandcamp, and Port-en-Bessin were strongly defended. On the long stretches of coast enjoying natural protection by reefs and cliffs, the strongpoints were widely spaced. The enemy had recognized that the Omaha sector was more favorable for attack from the sea, and 12 strongpoints were so placed as to be able to bring direct fire on the beach. The enemy's tactical plan for meeting assault was suggested by the disposition of his coastal defenses, which were concentrated at the beaches and were not developed in any depth. Every evidence pointed to the conclusion that the Germans intended a maximum effort on the coast, seeking either to smash the attack at the water's edge or, at worst, to hold the assaulting forces near the beach until mobile reserves could arrive to finish them off. The beach defenses were designed to stop the attacking force by obstacles and mines, both on the tidal flat and the beach shelf, while it was annihilated with concentrated fires from every type of defensive weapon. In 1944, at all main beaches practicable for massive landings, the Germans had begun to construct an elaborate system of obstacles along the tidal flat between the high- and low-water marks. These obstacles, designed to wreck or block off landing craft, had begun to appear in the Omaha sector early in April, and work on them was still in progress by D Day. The first band of obstructions consisted of a series of Element “C,” gate-like structures of reinforced iron frames with iron supports, on rollers, about 250 yards out from the high-water line. The main support girders were 10 feet high, and waterproofed Teller mines were lashed to the uprights. The second band, 20 to 25 yards landward, was composed of heavy logs driven into the sand at such an angle that the mine-tipped ends pointed seaward, or of log ramps, reinforced and mined. This belt was found to be more formidable than had been anticipated. One hundred and thirty yards from shore, the final row of obstructions included hedgehogs, about five and one-half feet high and made of three or more steel rails or angles, crossed at the centers and so strongly set Page 21 (Photo) Page 22 (Map No. 2) Page 23 that the ends would stave in the bottoms of landing craft. None of these bands were continuous, the elements being staggered at irregular intervals. There were no mines in the tidal sands. Shortly after work began o n these obstacles, Allied intelligence learned of the new development, and Allied planning staffs were preparing measures to meet this new and serious complication in the assault problem. If the attacking troops reached the bank of shingle at the edge of the tidal sands, they would still have to cross the narrow shelf of beach flat to reach the bluffs. The Germans made liberal use of wire and mines to slow up movement beyond the shingle. Along most of the beach, a row of concertina wire was placed just to landward of the shingle; at the western end, the wire was on top of the sea wall. Irregularly placed minefields, usually posted with warning signs, lay in the flat ground behind the wire and on the bluff slope. In addition to the ordinary types, there were rock fougasses (charges of TNT covered by rock and set off by trip wire, sometimes in the concertina), ordinary trip-wire mines, French “buttercup” mines, and mustard pots. Some dummy minefields consisted of scrap iron planted below the ground surface, but most of the fields were real. Enemy firing positions were laid out to cover the tidal flat and beach shelf with direct fire, both plunging and grazing, from all types of weapons. Observation on the whole Omaha area, and flanking fire from cliff positions at either end, were aided by the crescent curve of the shore line. The emplacements between Vierville and Pointe de la Percee were particularly dangerous because of their ability to deliver enfilade fire on a large stretch of the landing area. Each strongpoint was a complex system made up of elements including pillboxes, gun casemates, open positions for light guns, and firing trenches, surrounded by minefields and wire (Map No. 2). The elements were connected with each other and with under- Page 24 (Photo) Page 25 ground quarters and magazines by deep trenches or by tunnels. Most of the strong-points protecting Omaha were situated near the entrance to the draws, which were further protected by antitank ditches and road blocks. In some cases the elements of a strongpoint were echeloned from the north edge of the beach flat to the top of the bluff, with weapons sited for both grazing and plunging fire on every yard of approach to the draw. In June the Germans were still in process of completing or strengthening several strongpoints, including those guarding E-1 draw. While machine guns were the basic weapons in all emplacements, there were over 60 light artillery pieces of various types. Eight concrete casemates and four open field positions were designed for guns of caliber from 75-mm to 88-mm; 35 pillboxes were occupied by lighter guns; and there were about 18 antitank guns (37-mm to 75-mm). The heavier guns were sited to give lateral fire along the beach, with traverse limited by thick concrete wing-walls which concealed the flash of these guns and made them hard to spot from the sea. Mortar positions were sometimes included in the strongpoints but were more frequently placed behind the bluffs. About 40 rocket pits were later found, located several hundred yards inland on the high ground and each fitted to fire four 32-cm rockets. The considerable areas between the strong-points were supposed to be protected by their flanking fires, by minefields scattered on the beach flat and the slopes of the bluff, and by occasional trenches, rifle pits, and machinegun emplacements along the crest. While the line of defense was not continuous, no areas of beach were left uncovered in the pattern of defensive fires. Nearly all weapons, machine guns as well as artillery pieces, were sited primarily to give lateral fires down the length of the beach, and the defense of a given sector usually depended as much on the flanking fire from neighboring positions as on the emplacements in the sector itself. The Omaha sector was not strongly defended by coastal batteries of heavier guns. But at Pointe du Hoe, some 5,000 yards to the west, there was a battery believed to consist of six 155-mm howitzers (French make), mounted partly in casemates. This position was regarded as the most dangerous in the American one, for guns of that caliber could cover not only the V and VII Corps landing beaches but also both transport areas. Further west, at Maisy, was a battery estimated at four 155-mm howitzers and near Gefosse-Fontenay were four 105-mm field gun-howitzers. Both of these batteries were later found to consist of mobile field guns. Just beyond the First Army boundary, in the British one, the strong defenses of Port-en-Bessin included guns that might be used against the landing area at Omaha. All main enemy defenses in the Omaha sector were on the beach or just behind it; there was no evidence that the Germans had prepared positions inland for a defense in depth. There were known to be a few minefields in the fields just south of the bluffs, and some scattered emplacements at bivouac areas and assembly points. Defense beyond the beach would depend largely on the use of local reserves in counterattack. Page 26 Omaha Beach lay in the 53-mile sector reportedly held by the 716th Infantry Division, extending from the Orne River to the Vire Estuary (Map No. I). This was a defensive division, estimated at two regiments, two or three artillery battalions, and other small divisional units. Non-German elements in the division were estimated to be as high as 50 percent, mostly Poles or Russians, and morale was thought to be poor. The 726th Infantry Regiment was responsible for the coast defenses from west of Grandcamp to a point three miles east of Port-en-Bessin. According to the intelligence available, defending troops in the Omaha Beach strongpoints amounted to about a reinforced battalion, some 800 to 1,000 troops, most of them needed to man the beach defenses. Local reserves of the 716th Division were estimated at three battalions, two of these near enough to the Omaha assault area to reach it in two or three hours. Counterattacks by these units were not regarded as likely to be effective against penetrations of the beach defenses, and major counterattacks would depend on the arrival of mobile reserves. The nearest of these to the Omaha area, and the most likely to be committed there was the 352d Infantry Division, reported as stationed in the St- Lo-Caumont area some 20 miles inland. Commanded by Lt. Gen. Heinz Hellmich, this was an offensive division of good quality, with a core of veterans experienced in fighting on the Russian front, and was expected to furnish most of the opposition Page 27 to V Corps. It was at full strength, with three infantry regiments and normal artillery of three battalions of 105-mm and one battalion of 150- mm howitzers. By commandeering local transportation, the enemy was believed able to get one regimental combat team of this division into the Omaha area by afternoon of D Day. In addition, the three small battalions of the 30th Mobile Brigade, headquarters at Coutances, might be used for early counterattack. These battalions, consisting of three companies each, were provided with adequate transport for quick movement. Other enemy mobile reserves, including his available armored divisions, were located nearer the Caen-Bayeux area in the British one. V Corps units were warned to guard against possible armored counterattack on this flank by late on D Day. The three German divisions in the Cotentin peninsula were expected to be completely occupied by VII Corps' attack [6] and by the need for defending the Cherbourg area against possible further landings. It was thought that the German air force would make a supreme effort against the Allied convoy and landing operations. Despite his heavy air losses during the winter, the enemy was believed capable of making 1,500 sorties on D Day, mainly of fighters and fighter-bombers. In view of the overwhelming Allied naval strength, there was little fear of enemy surface action against the assault convoy. Enemy capabilities would [6] The 245th Infantry Division. believed to be guarding the coat from Coutances to Avranches (See Map No. 1), was found in July to have been in the Dieppe region at the time of the invasion. Page 28 be limited to harassing raids by E-Boats on the flanks of the convoy lane, and underwater attack by U-Boats from bases in western France. Pre-Assault Bombardment Plans The assault landings on Omaha Beach were to be preceded by intensive air and naval bombardment in the half-hour before touchdown, designed to neutralize all known gun positions and to demoralize enemy troops in the beach defenses. For the period just previous to D Day air attacks were planned against coastal batteries in the NEPTUNE area, but only as part of a widespread program which put its heaviest attacks on the French coast north of the Seine. The Pointe du Hoe position, one of the priority targets in this pre-D-Day bombing had been hit on 15 April, 22 May, and 4; June. The RAF was to conclude the effort against coastal batteries with a concentrated attack between midnight and dawn of D Day; the coastal batteries from the mouth of the Seine to Cherbourg were the Page 29 target of 1,333 heavy bombers dropping 5,316 tons of bombs. From H-30 to H-5 minutes heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force would strike enemy beach defenses in the assault area between the Vire and the Orne. In the V Corps' zone 480 B-24's were to attack 13 target areas with 1,285 tons of bombs. Of these targets, 11 were between Pointe de la Percee and the eastern end of the Omaha landing one, including every strongpoint in the system of beach defenses. The loading consisted for the most part of 100-pound fragmentation and high-explosive bombs, with some 500-pound high-explosive bombs for certain strongpoints. All loads were fitted with instantaneous fuze in order to prevent cratering of the beach and consequent delay in movement of traffic across it. West of Omaha, the battery positions at Pointe du Hoe would receive a final attack by 18 medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force, delivered between H- 20 and H-5 minutes. In the same period, mediums would deliver a blow of equal weight at Maisy, and the gun positions there and at Gefosse- Fontenay were the targets of two squadrons of fighter-bombers. Naval gunfire would commence at H-40 minutes and continue to H-3 minutes. The battleships TEXAS and ARKANSAS (mounting a total of ten 14- inch, twelve 12-inch, and twelve 5-inch guns) would fire from 18,000 yards off shore. About 600 rounds of their heaviest shells would be aimed at the enemy coastal battery at Pointe du Hoe and at the enemy strongpoints defending Exit D-3. Three cruisers, with 6-inch or 152-mm guns, had as targets for 950 rounds the enemy defenses near Port-en- Bessin and the strong-points near D-3 and E-1 draws. Firing at 1,800 yards from swept lanes on the flanks of the landing-craft approach area, eight destroyers (4- and 5-inch guns) were to put 2.000 rounds on the beach strongpoints. In addition to the ships, a large number of fire-support craft were to place area fire on the beach defenses, and point fire on certain other targets. Five LCG (L)'s with two 47-mm guns each, accompanying the leading assault wave, were scheduled to fire 630 rounds on selected strongpoints beginning at H-20 minutes. Sixteen LCT (A and HE)'s, carrying tanks to land in the first wave, were each fitted so that two M-4's could fire over the ramp, beginning from a range of 3,000 yards at about H-15 minutes; each gun had an allowance of 150 rounds. Ten LCT (5) s carried the 36105-mm howitzers (self-propelled) of the 58th and 62d Armored Field Artillery Battalions, due to land in the third hour of the assault. These howitzers were mounted to fire from the LCT's, opening at a range of 8,000 yards about H-30 and closing at a range of 3,700 yards by H-5 minutes. Their allowance was 100 rounds per gun. Finally, 9 LCT (R)'s stationed in positions 3,000 yards o shore were to fire 1,000 HE rockets each when the leading assault wave was 300 yards from the beach. Analysis of the combined plans shows that the great weight of air and naval bombardment would fall on the immediate beach defenses in the Omaha area, including positions which could put flanking fire on the beach. All the main enemy strongpoints, and the Pointe du Hoe coastal battery, were targets for attack both from air and sea. Beginning at H Hour naval fires would shift to inland targets such as possible assembly areas, or wait for direction by naval shore fire control parties. There were 24 of these, permitting an allotment of one to each battalion (including the Ranger Battalions) in the two assault divisions, excepting the regiment in corps reserve. High-performance spotting aircraft would be available up to H+5 hours. For purposes of supporting the attack inland, Fire Support Page 30 Group I, consisting of a battleship, cruiser, and four destroyers, would be on call for the 29th Division units and Fire Support Group II, a battleship, two cruisers, and four destroyers, for the 1st Division. Plan of Assault Landings Air and naval bombardment was designed to soften up the beach defenses; the main job of reducing them and breaking through inland would have to be done by the assault landing teams. These had been built up to include every type of specialized technique and weapon needed in the fight at the beach. Every unit, down to the smallest, had been trained to carry out a particular task in a definite area (Maps Nos. II, IV, V, VI). For purposes of the landing operations, the whole Omaha area had been divided into beach sectors and sub-sectors, with six sub-sectors falling in the main one of landings. The 1st Division planned an attack by two regiments abreast. On the two easterly sub-sectors (Easy Red and Fox Green), totaling about 3,000 yards, the 16th RCT would assault with two battalion landing teams abreast, one on each sub-sector; the support BLT would touchdown on Easy Red at H+70 minutes. On the four western sub- sectors (Dog Green, Dog White, Dog Red, and Easy Green), totaling about 3,000 yards, the 116th RCT would likewise assault with two BLT' s abreast, the support battalion coming in on the three eastern sub- sectors. The Provisional Ranger Force of two battalions (six companies each), attached to the 116th RCT, had special missions on the right flank. Three companies of the 2d Ranger Battalion were to scale the cliffs at Pointe du Hoe, three miles west of the main landings, and take the fortified battery positions. One company of the same unit would land just west of the 116th near Exit D-1 and assault the enemy positions at Pointe de la Percee. If the assault at Pointe du Hoe was successful by H+30 minutes, the 5th Ranger Battalion and the remaining companies of the 2d Battalion would land there; if not, they would come in on Dog Green at H+70 and proceed overland for attack on Pointe du Hoe. Further break-down of the assault tactics can best be followed in terms of the landing schedule, which brought the BLT's and their specialized supporting attachments ashore in a pattern to conform to the expected needs and development of the battle. The schedule for the 116th RCT may be taken as representative. (See Landing Diagram, 116th RCT, and Maps Nos. V, VI.) H Hour would be fixed so as to bring in the first landing waves as soon after dawn as possible, and under conditions of tide low enough to expose fully the underwater beach obstacles. This timing was an essential feature of the assault plans. It meant that the first waves would have to cross several hundred yards of open ground on the tidal flat, but it would allow an engineer task force to clear lanes through the obstacles before the arrival of larger forces and supplies at high water. At H-5 minutes Companies B and C (DD tanks) of the 743d Tank Battalion would make the first touchdown on Dog White and Dog Green. These tanks, fitted to navigate on water or land, were to be launched from 6,000 yards out, swim ashore, and take up firing positions at the water's edge to cover the first phase of the assault. Their fire was to be placed on the main enemy fortifications, particularly those west of Exit D-l which could bring flanking fire on Dog Beach. Moving up through the obstacles as the tide rose, the tanks would support the main assault and then clear the beach through Exit D-3. At H Hour eight LCT's would land Company A of the 743d Page 31 (Chart) Page 32 Battalion on Easy Green and Dog Red. This unit had a mission similar to that of the other tank companies. With Company A were landed eight tank dozers, towing trailers of explosive and scheduled for use by engineers in demolition work on obstacles. All three companies were attached to the battalion landing teams to insure closest coordination with the infantry assault. At H+1 minute the first infantry assault wave would touch down: four companies, each loaded in six LCVP's and correspondingly organized in boat sections rather than platoons. Company A would land on Dog Green, spearheading the 1st BLT's attack on the important Exit D-1. Companies E, F, and G were on the three sub-sectors to the east. This primary assault force was to cross the tidal flat through the obstacles and make its attack immediately on the German defenses. The boat sections were to operate as tactical units, each carrying out a carefully planned assault mission in a well-defined sector. The sections would assist each other in the work of reducing the beach defenses, but no attempt was to be made to organize for action as companies until an inland assembly point had been reached. The infantry attack, together with the fire of the tanks, would occupy the attention of the German strongpoints and cover the work on demolition of beach obstacles by the Special Engineer Task Force. That Force was to come in at H+3 to H+8 minutes in 13 LCM's. Army personnel (for this section of the beach) was composed of the 146th Engineer Combat Battalion, organized in eight assault and four support teams, and a control section. [7] Averaging 41 men each, 11 of the teams included a Naval Combat Demolition Unit of an officer and 12 men. They had a vital mission to perform: landing when the tide was below the obstacles, to clear and mark lanes through the beach obstacles so that craft could reach the upper sands at flood stage of the tide. In the 116th's half of the beach, they were to prepare eight 50-yard gaps through all obstacles (two gaps per sub-sector). The eight tank dozers would be used to push, break, and tow off obstacles at the lower edge of the beach. Demolitions would be used on other obstacles, and mine crews would take care of the mines on obstacles and (if found) in the sand. A 30-minute interval would be allowed for the work of the Engineer Special Task Force. Beginning at H+30 minutes, the second and larger group of assault waves would come to shore in a sequence of 5 landings, spaced over 30 minutes. These would bring in the remaining units o the two assault BLT's and (behind the 2d BLT the supporting 3d BLT. Also included were battalion and regimental headquarters, two companies of the 81st Chemical Weapons Battalion, and elements of the 112th and 121st Engineer Combat Battalions. This second contingent of engineers had the mission of assisting the assault infantry through minefields and obstacles on their route of advance, and of opening the beach exits for passage of vehicles by H+3 hours They would then move inland with the 116th RCT, one of their first tasks being to open the transit vehicle areas. Advance elements of still a third engineer force were due in with the second series of landings. This force comprised the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, commanded by Brig. Gen. William M. Hog and organized in two brigades of three battalions each. They would aid in clearing the beach area of mines and obstacles and in opening exits; then, when the engineers attached to 116th RCT went inland, the [7] In the 16th RCT’s sector, the 299th Engineer Combat Battalion furnished the Army contingent for this force. Page 33 Brigade Group engineers would take over organization, operation, and maintenance of the beach installations up to the beachhead maintenance line. Between H+90 and H+120 minutes the first artillery units would come in, led by the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, which had taken part in the preparatory bombardment by fire from LCT's. Dukws would bring in the 111th Field Artillery Battalion, the 467th AAA AW Battalion, and the antitank and cannon companies of the 116th RCT. Some vehicles had been included in the second wave; however, the real influx of vehicles and supply would come from H+180 minutes on, in steadily mounting proportion. By H+240 minutes there would be cranes, tank-recovery vehicles, half-tracks, and trucks of all types on shore. From that time on, rhino-ferries and dukws were to play a large part in transport of vehicles and supply. On Easy Red and Fox Green, the 16th RCT (with attachments) was to land by a very similar plan. The differences in respect to infantry landings can be seen on Maps Nos. V and VI. Of the three companies of the 741st Tank Battalion, B and C (DD's) were to land on Easy Red and Fox Green respectively, with Company A astride the boundary of these sectors. The employment of engineer units was similar for both parts of Omaha Beach, [8] and artillery and supply elements would come in at about the same rhythm. The larger support elements of the assault force were to start landings on Omaha at H+195 minutes, when the 18th RCT would reach Easy Red. The infantry elements of the 115th RCT were to touch down behind the 116th on orders of the commanding general, V Corps, and to operate initially under 1st Division control. Plan for Movement to Inland Objectives As the landing schedule clearly shows, the two assault regimental combat teams were expected to break through the beach defenses within the first two hours after touchdown. The enemy strongpoints protecting the exit draws were to be neutralized early enough to permit their opening for traffic off the beach by H+3 hours. After reducing beach defenses in their allotted ones, the companies in the assault battalion landing teams were to make their way to battalion assembly areas, ordinarily about a thousand yards inland. From there on, the battalions would operate toward assigned missions inland (Map No. IV). In the 16th RCT zone, the 2d BLT had the mission of seizing Colleville, then fanning out beyond and holding the high ground just south of that village so as to cover later landings against possible enemy counterattack from Trevieres or Bayeux. The 3d BLT, once on the plateau, was to turn east and reduce the enemy defenses along the bluff as far as Ste-Honorine-des-Pertes; then, to cover the eastern flank of the division, along the army boundary, by occupying the high ground as far as Mount Cauvin. The 1st BLT, in support during the beach assault, would move through the 2d Battalion, capture Formigny on the main highway, occupy the high ground overlooking Trevieres and the Aure Valley near that village, and secure the river bridges near Trevieres Positions for all-around defense against possible enemy counterattack were to be secured and organized by all battalions. Of the other 1st Division units, the 18th RCT, assembling under cover of the advance made by the 16th RCT, would move across the Aure southeast of Colleville and occupy the high ground east of Trevieres, patrolling to the D-Day phase line. The 26th RCT, loaded in Force “B” and landing when [8] The demolition team had the mission of clearing six gaps on Easy Red and two on Fox Green. Page 34 ordered by corps, would revert on landing to the 1st Division. Its mission was to seize and organize for defense the area south and southeast of Tour-en-Bessin, in contact toward Bayeux with 50 (British) Division. On the western flank of the beachhead, 29th Division units had the mission of occupying the important area between the flooded Aure Valley and the sea. After capturing Vierville the 1st BLT would move west along the coastal highway, and together with the Rangers clear out enemy defenses from the beachhead to the Vire Estuary. It would be ready to seize Isigny and the important bridge there and to make contact with VII Corps to the west. The 2d BLT had St-Laurent as its first objective and then the higher ground southwest of that point. The 3d BLT landing in support was to move through Longueville, occupy the high ground 2,500 yards to the west, and prepare for advance toward Isigny. The 115th Infantry, landing in attachment to the 1st Division, would assist if necessary in mopping up the beach defenses in the one of either of the assault regimental combat teams. It would be prepared to move through Longueville to the la Cambe area, outpost the high ground south of the Aure, and patrol considerably to the south of the outposts. The 175th Infantry, in Force “B” and designated as corps reserve, was scheduled to land on D+1. Artillery support would be given by five battalions of 105-mm howitzers landing in attachment to the regiments of the 1st Division, two each to the assault RCT's. These battalions were to move inland with the advance. Additional fire support would be rendered by the heavier guns of the Navy, directed by the fire control parties with the infantry battalions. If successful, this plan put V Corps in position to advance on D+1 south beyond the Aure toward the key high ground in the Cerisy Forest area, and west through Isigny toward a junction with VII Corps. Corps plans did not contemplate movement in force beyond the Vire, as it was hoped that the southward advance would compel an early enemy retreat from the area between the Vire and Carentan. Page 35 D DAY: THE LANDINGS THE SELECTION OF D DAY was governed by several factors, complicated by the need of satisfying Allied requirements in five different landing areas, each with its own problems. It was desirable that D Day fall during a period when the days were long, for maximum use of Allied air power; when the moon was near the full, for better maneuver of ships and for easier night landings of airborne troops; and when tides were strong, so that beach obstacles would be fully exposed at low water and the landing craft could be floated far up the beach for convenient unloading at high water. Further, D Day must be selected with reference to certain requirements for H Hour, the moment when the first assault units touched down on the beaches. These were: that there be an hour of daylight before H Hour so that the preliminary bombardment would be as accurate as possible, and landing craft could be more easily organized into formation for the assault; that the tide should be near half-flood, so that obstacles would still be exposed, but rock ledges near the shore in the British one would not be dangerous; and that the tide be rising at H Hour, insuring two high tides during daylight to facilitate maximum unloading of supplies. Certain groups of days came nearest to satisfying all these requirements: 21-22-23 May, 5-6-7 June, and 19-20-21 June were closest to the target date of 1 June. On 8 May, D Day was fixed at 5 June. V Corps units had been alerted on 23 March to be ready for movement to marshaling areas on short notice. Actually, movement began 7 May and was completed by 11 May for elements of the assault and follow-up forces (“O” and “B”). The pre-embarkment handling of 65,000 men and 7,600 vehicles was accomplished by the XVIII and XIX Districts of the Southern Base Section, Services of Supply. Once in the marshaling areas, troops were “sealed” in their camps, given final items of equipment, and thoroughly briefed on all phases of their assignments. During the last few days of May, they were moved from the marshaling points to the ports and “hards” [9] for embarkation, their places being immediately taken by units designated to follow across the Channel in build-up schedules. By 3 June all troops of Force “O” had been loaded, and some of them had been aboard several days. Portland, Weymouth, and Poole were the embarkation areas. On the night of 27 May, a small enemy air attack on the Weymouth area caused some losses of a few smaller craft by mines. Aside from this raid, the loadings suffered no interference from enemy action, and German air reconnaissance up to D Day was on a routine scale. The story of the Navy's share in operation NEPTUNE must be told elsewhere. Western Task Force, commanded by Rear Adm. Alan G. Kirk, was responsible for the embarkation and landing of First U. S. Army [9] Beach areas given a hard surface by wire mats, concrete blocks, or other treatment so as to permit direct loading of vehicles from sand to ships. Page 36 forces. Rear Adm. J. L. Hall, Jr., commanded Force “O,” which would carry the assault against Omaha Beach. The magnitude and complexity of the movement may be suggested by figures. To lift and land this initial assault force of 34,000 men and 3,300 vehicles required 7 transports, 8 LSI's, 24 LST's, 33 LCI (L)'s, 36 LCM (3)'s, 147 LCT's, and 33 other craft, while the escort, gunfire support, and bombardment missions employed 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 12 destroyers, and 105 other ships. Force “O” also included 33 mine-sweepers and 585 vessels used in service work. The 16th RCT, including 3,502 men and 295 vehicles attached only for movement to the beach, numbered 9,828 personnel, 919 vehicles, and 48 tanks. To handle this one unit required 2 transports, 6 LST's, 53 LCT's (of various types), and 5 LCI (L)'s; small craft, to be launched from the larger ships in the transport area, included 81 LCVP's, 18 LCA's (British), 13 other landing craft, and about 64 dukws. The assault of this armada was dependent on the weather, which could so easily influence both naval and air operations. At the last minute, with all assault forces loaded and waiting for the signal to start, Operation NEPTUNE was threatened with checkmate. On 3 June, his meteorological staff gave General Eisenhower an unfavorable forecast for D Day, predicting overcast skies and strong winds. At 0415 on 4 June he decided to postpone D Day 24 hours. One of the divisions of the assault convoy had already started out to sea, according to schedule, and had to be recalled. Page 37 Weather forecasts on 4 June held out hopes for a slight but temporary improvement. Beginning on 5 June and lasting about 24 hours, there would be an interval of better sky conditions, with broken clouds at a ceiling not lower than 3,000 feet. Seas were expected to moderate. Following this break, the prospects were for renewed cloud and stronger winds. Postponement to 7 June would therefore risk a deterioration of weather conditions, as well as fueling difficulties for some of the ships in convoys already at sea; further postponement would mean a delay until 19 June before tide and moon conditions were again suitable. General Eisenhower decided at 0415 on 5 June to accept the risks involved in making the assault under the conditions of sea and sky expected for the next day. H Hour for Omaha Beach was set at 0630. [10] Low tide would occur at 0525 and the first high water 1100. Sunrise was at 0558 and sunset 2207. The main convoy of Force “O” cleared Portland Harbor on the afternoon of 5 June; movement across 100 miles of channel to the assault area was uneventful. The operation met no interference from action by enemy naval or air forces. Continuous air cover was provided for the shipping lane and for the Allied assault beaches. Spitfires protected the convoys at low altitudes; patrols of four squadrons of P-47's from the Ninth and Eighth Air Forces were over the shipping lane and its flanks at all times. [10] The Allied assault forces used four different H Hours, to meet the differing conditions of tide and bottom on the main assault beaches. The hour was 0630 at Omaha and Utah, while the British landings carne between 0700 and 0730. Page 38 The assault beach ones were to receive continuous cover by fighters, the Ninth Air Force detailing five groups for high cover, with the task of maintaining three squadrons over the Allied beaches at all times during daylight. Low cover was a British commitment. One of the most important contributions to the whole operation was performed by the sweepers of Western Task Force, which made possible the passage of the convoys to the assault beaches without loss from mines. The Ancon, headquarters ship for Admiral Hall and General Gerow, anchored at 0251 on D Day in the transport area, 23,000 yards off Omaha Beach. In spite of some improvement over the previous period, weather conditions were far from ideal for the assault operations. Visibility was 10 miles, but there was a partial overcast to hamper bombing. The wind was still strong, coming from the northwest and therefore producing its full effects on the coastal waters off the Omaha sector. A wind force of 10 to 18 knots caused waves averaging 3 to 4 feet high in the transport area, with occasional waves up to 6 feet. On the beach, breakers were 3 to 4 feet. This condition of the sea persisted well into D+1 before the wind moderated. The effect on the landing plans was to be felt throughout D Day. Approach to the Beach The movement from transport area to shore proceeded according to a complex schedule, involving hundreds of craft and requiring the nicest timing to get the assault elements to the shore in their appointed order. One of the first steps was the loading of the assault infantry units from their transports into the small LCVP's and LCA's, which were launched from the larger mother ships. The process began three to four hours before Hour and was rendered difficult by the choppy seas, which caused some minor delays. Carrying the early waves of 116th assault troops, the transport Thomas Jefferson was able to unload all its craft in 66 minutes, aided by the fact that 25 of the 33 craft could be “rail- loaded” and then swung overside. The Thomas Jefferson craft left the rendezvous area at 0430, 25 minutes ahead of schedule, since control officers feared the conditions of sea would delay the approach run. More serious effects of the rough seas were felt as the smaller craft moved in through the rendezvous area to the line of departure. The LCVP's and LCA's were drenched with spray from the start, and most of them began to ship enough water to demand full use of the pumps. In a good many craft the pumps would not carry the load, and the assault troops had to bail with their helmets. Craft having pump troubles were likely to be slowed down, and any attempt to raise the speed and catch up resulted in shipping more water than before. Only a small minority of the craft were in serious difficulties. Out of 180 to 200 craft used for the two assault RCT's, 10 carrying infantry are definitely known to have swamped, some almost at the start and others near the beach. Nearly all personnel from the swamped craft were rescued by naval craft or passing ships, often after hours in the water. In most of the craft the soldiers were drenched from the outset by the cold spray, and seasickness overcame a great majority. Boat teams in the same formations, carrying men who had eaten the same breakfast and had the same training, were very unevenly affected, the “casualty” rates ranging all the way from zero to 100 percent. Men who had been chilled by their wetting, cramped by immobility in the small and fully loaded craft, and weakened by seasickness were not in the best condition for strenuous action on Page 39 landing. Similar handicaps, however, had been met and overcome at training exercises, and many men, even among the seasick, were keyed up by the occasion. One officer remembered his troops chatting about “What a shambles the beach would be from the bombs and ships' guns,” although his own impression was: “It looked like another big tactical scheme off Slapton Sands, and I couldn't get the feeling out of my head that it was going to be another miserable two-day job with a hot shower at the end.” As the landing craft carrying the 16th RCT units came within a few miles of shore they passed men struggling in life preservers and on rafts. These were personnel from foundered DD tanks, the first casualties of the rough seas. According to plan, Companies B and C of the 741st Tank Battalion were launched at H-50 minutes, 6,000 yards off shore, to lead in the first assault wave on the eastern beach sectors. In very short order the DD's bean to suffer crippling damage in broken struts, torn canvas, and engine trouble from water flooding the engine compartment. Of the 32 tanks, 2 swam in and 3 others were beached from an LCT which could not launch its DD's because of a damaged ramp. In the 116th RCT zone, the officers in charge of the tank-loaded LCT's had decided not to risk the conditions of sea, and the 32 DD's of the 743d Tank Battalion were carried in to the beach. In terms of ultimate effects, all these difficulties were minor by comparison with those of navigation. The plan called for landing each assault unit in a relatively small, defined area where it had a specific task to perform in reducing enemy defenses, opening gaps in obstacles, or clearing a section of the flat. Quick success on the beach was dependent on carrying out a large number of such small tasks, which were often correlated to lead to some major result such as the opening of an exit. Page 40 Despite all the intensive study put on conditions of current and wind for this part of the coast, all the visual aids for spotting beachmarks by panoramic photographs, and all the experience with similar difficulties in training exercises, a great many landing craft of the first waves came in away from their target sectors. Smoke and dust along the beach from naval fire and a slight early morning mist made it hard to recognize landmarks as the shore was neared. One of the control vessels for Dog Beach drifted off its station, which may explain some of the later troubles of approach in that sector. The fact that practically all the mislanded craft were east of their targets points to he tidal current as a contributing factor. It was known that with a rising tide (low tide on 6 June was at 0525), a strong current ran laterally eastward along Omaha Beach, reaching maximum velocity of nearly 2.7 knots at 5 miles off shore; strong winds might increase its average velocity. That the current was very strong on D Day is indicated by the report of the destroyer Satterlee, which found it necessary to steer 20 to 30 degrees “up current” in order to maintain position in the firing lane. Whatever the cause, a majority of landing craft during the first hour came in east of their appointed beach sector, and this majority included craft bearing engineers as well as infantry (Maps Nos. V, VI). Sometimes the margin of error was as much as a thousand yards or more; one company (E) of the 116th, destined for Easy Green, came in, boat sections scattered, on the 16th beaches as far east as Fox Green. More often, the error was in the order of a few hundred yards, but this could be enough to undo the Page 41 assignments for taking out a key strong-point or opening an exit. It might also be enough to completely “lose” units which landed below an unfamiliar stretch of bluff, were consequently unable to identify the terrain, and so could not make a proper estimate of the enemy defenses with which they must deal. The resulting difficulties of the boat teams were heightened by the frequent separation of sections of the same company. Whether because of delays suffered by individual craft, straggling on the way in, or disagreement between coxswains in recognition of landmarks, some unit formations of landing craft were broken up enough to result in widely scattered landings. Under conditions prevailing at the beach, separation of craft by as little as 200 yards could easily bring about the complete isolation of a section. This would deny elements of a mislanded company the advantages of combining in order to improvise their assault if they came to shore in strange territory. Sections which suffered heavy casualties in leaders might be particularly affected by separation. The landing craft came in under the comforting thunder of the tremendous fire support from naval guns, as well as the tank and artillery pieces firing from LCT's. [11] Up to within a few hundred yards of the water's edge, there was every reason to hope that the enemy shore defenses might have been neutralized. Then, many of the leading craft began to come under fire from automatic weapons and artillery, which increased in volume as they approached touchdown. It was evident at H Hour that the enemy fortifications had not been knocked out. Just how much had been accomplished by the preliminary bombardment can only be determined later from enemy sources. Many gun positions and strongpoints certainly survived the early fire. The well-concealed emplacements were hard enough to locate later in the day, with better visibility and chances for observation. The tanks and artillery operating from LCT's in rough water were handicapped by conditions making accurate fire difficult. The rockets, according to most reports from the assault troops, made a heartening display but ailed to hit defensive positions-an opinion which cannot be accepted as final and which runs counter to naval reports. The total bombardment had certainly had effect, and it may have been more considerable than the infantry could realize. Enemy guns had been sited to cover every part of the beach; nevertheless, there were sectors where units landed without meeting any artillery fire whatever. Furthermore, of the nearly 200 craft carrying the assault infantry to shore in the first 2 hours, only about 10 are known to have been hit by artillery before debarking their troops, none was sunk by this fire, and in only a few cases were the casualties serious. Larger craft, particularly LCI's, may have been a favored target for both shore and inland guns, and may have suffered relatively more. The assault troops experienced their worst disappointment of the day when they found the beach unscarred by air bombardment; they were correct in concluding that the air bombardment had had little effect on the beach defenses. Overcast conditions forced the use of Pathfinder instruments by the Eighth Air Force Liberators. With that technique, the range of possible error in the drop would be so increased as to endanger the approaching waves of landing craft. A bombing plan had already been made to cover this eventuality, by delaying the time of bomb release enough to push the center of the estimated drop patterns well inland, [11] The only reaction from enemy coastal batteries came earlier, and from eastward; at 0537 guns near Port-en-Bessin put 10 rounds close to the destroyer Emmons and bracketed the Arkansas. Answering fire, including 20 rounds of 12-inch and 110 rounds of 5-inch shells, promptly silenced the enemy guns, but more counterbattery work had to be done on this area later in the morning. Page 42 thus ensuring the safety of the craft. Varying inversely with the distance in time from H Hour, the delay ranged to as much as 30 seconds. The decision to use this alternate plan had to be made on the night preceding D Day and was approved by Supreme Headquarters. It meant that the impact of the bomb weight fell from a few hundred yards to three miles inland, and the main effect, difficult to evaluate without enemy records, was probably to disrupt enemy communications and rear assembly areas. Of 446 Liberators dispatched, 329 attacked, dropping over 13,000 bombs. Their attack had taken place between 0555 and 0614. The Initial Assault Wave Ninety-six tanks, the Special Engineer Task Force, and eight companies of assault infantry (1,450 men), landing just before and after 0630, were to carry out the first assault missions (Map No. V). On the right, the 743d Tank Battalion brought in all its tanks on LCT's. Company B, coming in directly in face of the Vierville draw, suffered from enemy artillery fire. The LCT carrying the company commander was sunk just of shore, and four other officers were killed or wounded, leaving one lieutenant in Company B. Eight of that company's 16 tanks landed and started to fire from the water's edge on enemy positions. The tanks of Companies C and A touched down to the east at well-spaced intervals and without initial losses. In the 16th RCT one, only 5 of the 32 DD tanks (741st Tank Battalion) made shore; of Company A's 16 standard tanks, 2 were lost far off shore by an explosion of undetermined cause, and 3 were hit and put out of action very shortly after beaching. The surviving third of the battalion landed between E-1 and E-3 draws and went into action at once against enemy emplacements. The Army-Navy Special Engineer Task Force had one of the most important and difficult missions of the landing. Their chances of clearing gaps through the obstacles in the half-hour allotted were lessened by accidents on the approach to the beach. Delays in loading from LCT's to LCM's and in finding their way to the beaches resulted in half of the 16 assault teams reaching shore 10 minutes or more late. Only five team hit their appointed sector, most of them being carried eastward with the result that Dog Beach (the 116th RCT one) received much less than the effort scheduled. As a further effect of mislandings, at least three teams came in where no infantry or tanks were present to give protective fire. Men burdened with equipment and explosives were excellent targets for enemy fire as they unloaded in water often several feet deep. Of 16 doers only 6 got to the beach in working condition, and 3 of these were immediately disabled by artillery hits. Much equipment, including nearly all buoys and poles for marking lanes, was lost or destroyed before it could be used. Eight navy personnel of Team 11 were dragging the preloaded rubber boat off their LCM when an artillery shell burst just above the load of explosives and set off the primacord. One of the eight survived. Another shell hit the LCM of Team 14, detonating explosives on the deck and killing all navy personnel. Team 15 was pulling in its rubber boat through the surf when a mortar scored a direct hit and touched o the explosives, killing three men and wounding four. Support Team F came in about 0700. A first shell hit the ramp, throwing three men into the water. As the vessel drifted of out of control, another hit squarely on the bow, killing 15 of the team. Only five army personnel from this craft reached shore. Despite such disasters and under continued intense fire, the engineers got to work on Page 43 obstacles wherever they landed and with whatever equipment and explosives they could salvage. Some of the teams arriving a few minutes late found the rapidly advancing tide already into the lower obstacles. Infantry units landing behind schedule or delayed in starting up the beach came through the demolition parties as they worked, and thereby impeded their progress. One of the three doers left in operation was prevented from maneuvering freely by riflemen who tried to find shelter behind it from the intense fire. As a final handicap, there were instances where teams had fixed their charges, were ready to blow their lane, and were prevented by the fact that infantry were passing through or were taking cover in the obstacles. When Team 7 was set to fire, an LCVP came crashing into the obstacles, smashed through the timbers, and set of seven mines; the charge could not be blown. In another case, vehicles passed through the prepared area and caused misfire by cutting the primacord fuse linking the charges. A naval officer, about to pull the twin-junction igniters to explode his charge, was hit by a piece of shrapnel that cut of his finger and the two fuses. The charge laid by Team 12 went off but at heavy cost. Their preparations completed for a 30-yard gap, the team was just leaving the area to take cover when a mortar shell struck the primacord. The premature explosion killed and wounded 19 engineers and some infantry nearby. In net result, the demolition task force blew six complete gaps through all bands of obstacles, and three partial gaps. Of the six, only two were in the 116th's half of the beach, and four were on Easy Red (Map No. V), a fact which may have influenced later landing chances. Owing to the loss of equipment, only one of the gaps could be marked, and this diminished their value under high-water conditions. Their first effort made, the demolition teams joined the other assault forces on the shingle or sea wall and waited for the next low tide to resume their work. Casualties for the Special Engineer Task Force, including navy personnel, ran to 41 percent for D Day, most of them suffered in the first half-hour. The infantry companies in the first wave came in by boat sections, six to a company, with a headquarters section due in the next wave (0700). Each LCVP carried an average of 31 men and an officer. The 116th assault craft were loaded so that the first to land would be a section leader and 5 riflemen armed with M-1's and carrying 96 rounds of ammunition. Following was a wire-cutting team of 4 men, armed with rifles; 2 carried large "search-nose” cutters, and 2 a smaller type. Behind these in the craft, loaded so as to land in proper order were: 2 BAR teams of 2 men each, carrying 900 rounds per gun; 2 bazooka teams, totaling 4 men, the assistants armed with carbines; a mortar team of 4 men, with a 60-mm mortar and 15 to 20 rounds; a flame-thrower crew of 2 men; and, finally, 5 demolition men with pole and pack charges of TNT. A medic and the assistant section leader sat at the stern. Everybody wore assault jackets, with large pockets and built-in packs on the back; each man carried, in addition to personal weapons and special equipment, a gas mask, 5 grenades (the riflemen and wire-cutters also had 4 smoke grenades), a half-pound block of TNT with primacord fuse, and 6 one- third rations (3 K's and 3 D's). All clothing was impregnated against gas. The men wore life preservers (2 per man in 16th Infantry units), and equipment and weapons of the 16th were fastened to life preservers so that they could be floated in. As expected, few of the LCVP's and LCA's carrying assault infantry were able to make dry landings. Most of them grounded on sandbars 50 to 100 yards out, and in some Page 44 cases the water was neck deep. Under fire as they came within a quarter- mile of the shore, the infantry met their worst experiences of the day and suffered their heaviest casualties just after touchdown. Small-arms fire, mortars, and artillery concentrated on the landing area, but the worst hazard was produced by converging fires from automatic weapons. Survivors from some craft report hearing the fire beat on the ramps before they were lowered, and then seeing the hail of bullets whip the surf just in front of the lowered ramps. Some men dove under water or went over the sides to escape the beaten one of the machine guns. Stiff, weakened from seasickness, and often heavily loaded, the debarking troops had little chance of moving fast in water that was knee deep or higher, and their progress was made more difficult by uneven footing in the runnels crossing the tidal flat. Many men were exhausted before they reached shore, where they faced 200 yards or more of open sand to cross before teaching cover at the sea wall or shingle bank. Most men who reached that cover made it by walking, and under increasing enemy fire. Troop who stopped to organize, rest, or take shelter behind obstacles or tanks merely prolonged their difficulties and suffered heavier losses. Page 45 There were fortunate exceptions to this general picture. Several hundred yards of bluff west of les Moulins draw were obscured in heavy smoke from grass fires, apparently started by naval shells or rockets. Blanketed by this smoke, enemy guns and emplacements were unable to deliver effective fire on that end of Dog Beach, and units landing there were comparatively unscathed. At other places, what would seem to be an occasional “blind spot” in the enemy fire pattern let a craft get men ashore with few losses. In the main, the first wave was hard hit. Perhaps the worst area on the beach was Dog Green, directly in front of strongpoints guarding the Vierville draw and under heavy flanking fire from emplacements to the west, near Pointe de la Percee. Company A of the 116th was due to land on this sector with Company C of the 2d Rangers on its right flank, and both units came in on their targets. One of the six LCA's carrying Company A foundered about a thousand yards o shore, and passing Rangers saw men jumping overboard and being dragged down by their loads. At H+6 minutes the remaining craft grounded in water 4 to 6 feet deep, about 30 yards short of the outward band of obstacles. Starting off the craft in three files, center file first and the flank files peeling right and left, the men were enveloped in accurate and intense fire from automatic weapons. Order was quickly lost as the troops attempted to dive under water or dropped over the sides into surf over their heads. Mortar fire scored four direct hits on one LCA, which “disintegrated.” Casualties were suffered all the way to the sand, but when the survivors got there, some found they could not hold and came back into the water for cover, while others took Page 46 (Photo) Page 47 refuge behind the nearest obstacles. Remnants of one boat team on the right flank organized a small firing line on the first yards of sand, in full exposure to the enemy. In short order every officer of the company, including Capt. Taylor N. Fellers, was a casualty, and most of the sergeants were killed or wounded. The leaderless men gave up any attempt to move forward and confined their efforts to saving the wounded, many of whom drowned in the rising tide. Some troops were later able to make the sea wall by staying in the edge of the water and going up the beach with the tide. Fifteen minutes after landing, Company A was out of action for the day. Estimates of its casualties range as high as two- thirds. The smaller Ranger company (64 men), carried in two LCA's, came in at H+15 minutes to the right of Vierville draw. Shells from an antitank gun bracketed Capt. Ralph E. Goranson's craft, killing a dozen men and shaking up others. An enemy machine gun ranged in on the ramps of the second LCA and hit 15 Rangers as they debarked. Without waiting to organize, survivors of the boat sections set out immediately across 250 yards of sand toward the base of the cliff. Too tired to run, the men took three or four minutes to get there, and more casualties resulted from machine guns and mortars. Wounded men crawled behind them, and a few made it. When the Rangers got to shelter at the base of the cliff, they had lost 35 men. An unscheduled gap of more than a thousand yards separated Company A from the next unit of the 116th RCT. Instead of coming in on Dog White, Company G landed in scattered groups eastward from the edges of Dog Red. The three or four boat sections nearest Dog Red, where smoke from grass fires shrouded the bluff, had an easy passage across the tidal flat. Most of the men were halfway up the flat before they became aware of sporadic and inaccurate fire, and only a few losses were suffered. In 10 to 15 minutes after touchdown this part of the company was behind the shingle bank, in good condition. Officers, knowing they were left of their landing area, were uncertain as to their course of action, and this hesitation prevented any chance of immediate assault action. Further east on Easy Green, the other sections of Company G met much heavier fire as they landed, one boat team losing 14 men before it reached the embankment. Company F came into the beach almost on its scheduled target, touching down in front of the strongly fortified les Moulins draw (D-3). The 3 sections to the east, unprotected by the smoke, came under concentrated fire and took 45 minutes to get across the exposed stretch of sand. By this time half their number were casualties; the remnants reached cover in no state for assault action. The other sections had better fortune, but had lost their officers when they reached the shingle bank and were more or less disorganized. This completes the story of the first assault wave on half of Omaha Beach, for the fourth company (E) of the 116th, supposed to land on Easy Green, veered a mile eastward from that sector. The three companies in the 116th's one were in poor condition for carrying out their assault missions. By 0700 Company A had been cut to pieces at the water's edge, Company F was disorganized by heavy losses, and of the scattered sections of Company G, those in best shape were preparing to move west along the beach to find their assigned sector. To the east, in the 16th RCT's area, the picture differed only in detail. Easy Red Beach, over a mile long and fronting E-1 draw, was assigned to the 2d BLT, with Companies E and F landing in the first wave. Page 48 The bulk of both companies landed far to the east. The only infantry to come in on Easy Red in the first wave were two lost boat sections of Company E, 116th RCT, and one section each of Companies E and F, 16th RCT. All of them were between E-1 and E-3 draws. Men from two of the craft were put out in waist-deep water, but hit a deep runnel as they waded in and had to swim through surf and a strong tidal current pulling them eastward. Flamethrowers, mortars, bazookas, and many personal weapons were dropped in the struggle. The two 116th sections lost only two men from enemy fire up to the shingle--an experience suggesting the ill-fortune of the first wave in that so few landings were made on Easy Red. A little to their left, the 1st Section of Company F came into the belt of heavy enemy fire that apparently extended from there on eastward to E-3 draw; of the 31 men unloading in neck-deep water, only 14 reached the shingle. Except for these four sections-about a hundred men-the only assault elements on Easy Red Beach for the first half hour were four DD tanks, one already disabled. Very different was the record of the landings on Fox Beach. Whereas four scattered sections of infantry came into Easy Red without many casualties, the bulk of four companies (three of them scheduled for more westerly beaches) landed on Fox against every possible handicap of mislandings, delays, and enemy opposition. Less the one section already accounted for (on Easy Red), Company E of the 16th RCT touched down on the western part of Fox Green, the craft badly scattered over a front of nearly 800 yards. The final run-in was not costly, but crossing bands of automatic fire caught most of the craft as the ramps were lowered, and from there on losses were heavy. Most of them were incurred in the water, and among men who stopped to drag the wounded ashore. So exhausted and shaken were the assault troops that when they reached the sand, 300 yards from the shingle bank, most of them stopped there and crawled in just ahead of the tide. The greater number of the company's 105 casualties for D Day were suffered on the beach, in the first stage of assault. Four boat sections of Company E, 116th RCT, came in on the same beach sector and had much the same experience. From 3 of the sections, a total of 60 men reached the shingle bank. The company commander, Capt. Laurence A. Madill, already wounded crossing the beach, was hit twice by machine-gun bullets as he returned to salvage mortar ammunition. His last words were, “Senior non-com, take the men off the beach." The company's sections were separated, and it was some time before any contact was made between them. Five sections of Company F, 16th RCT, landed on Fox Green scattered all the way from E-3 draw to a point a thousand yards further east. Two sections landed close together in front of the strongpoints defending E- 3 draw. Mortars as well as machinegun fire got about one-third of the personnel before they made the shingle. Further east, the other three parties fared as badly, only seven men from one craft getting through the fire to the shingle. Two officers survived among Company F's widely separated sections. The two units scheduled to land on Fox Green, Companies I and L of the 16th RCT, were so delayed in the approach that they hardly figured in the first assault wave. Both, moreover, suffered from the eastward trend of all landings. Company I's craft, less two that swamped, headed almost as far east as Port-en-Bessin before the error was realized. An hour and a half was lost by this mishap. Company L touched down about 30 minutes late; supposed to land in Page 49 front of E-3, it came into the beach beyond the eastern end of Fox Green. One craft had foundered two miles off shore, losing eight men. Artillery fire came close as the remaining craft touched down, causing some casualties and destroying one craft just after the troops had debarked. Machine-gun fire caused heavier losses as the sections crossed 200 yards of beach to get to the shingle. The 3d Section, keeping extremely well spread out in movement, lost not a single man; the other sections had a total of 34 casualties. As a result of landing at the edge of Fox Green, the company was in a sector where the tidal flat almost reaches the bluff, and where the first rise of the bluff is cliff-like in steepness. In the defilade this afforded, the sections organized and started to move to the right where they could assault the bluff. Company L, reduced to 125 men, was the only one of the 8 companies in the first assault infantry which was ready to operate as a unit after crossing the lower beach. The misfortunes of the first wave were bound to condition the further course of the assault. Landing schedules on many sectors would be affected by the failure to clear obstacles. Fire support from the tanks would be much less than planned on the eastern part of the beach. Mislandings of the infantry units had produced bad gaps in the assault line along the sea wall and shingle, leaving certain areas, notably Dog White and Easy Red, almost bare of assault troops. Above all, stiff enemy resistance and the disorganization caused by mislandings and heavy casualties had combined to prevent infantry units in this wave from carrying out their mission of immediate assault. All the more credit is due those elements, most of them facing unfamiliar terrain and enemy defenses, which surmounted the shock of the worst period on the beach and shared in the first advances inland. The Later Assault Waves: 116th RCT Beginning at 0700, the second group of assault waves touched down in a series of landings that lasted for 40 minutes, ending with the support battalions of the two regimental combat teams (Map No. VI). The later waves did not come in under the conditions planned for their arrival. The tide, flowing into the obstacle belt by 0700, was through it an hour later, rising eight feet in that period; but the obstacles were gapped at only a few places. The enemy fire which had decimated the first waves was not neutralized when the larger landings commenced. No advances had been made beyond the shingle, and neither the tanks nor the scattered pockets of infantry already ashore were able to give much covering fire. Consequently, much of the record of this period is a repetition of what had happened earlier. Casualties continued to be heavy on some sectors of the narrowing tidal flat, though unit experiences differed widely and enemy fire, diverted or neutralized by the troops and tanks already along the embankment, was not often as concentrated as earlier in the assault. Mislandings continued to be a disrupting factor, not merely in scattering the infantry units but also in preventing engineers from carrying out special assignments and in separating headquarters elements from their units, thus hindering reorganization. Rifle companies in the later assault waves of the 116th Infantry were organized somewhat differently from those in the first landings. Two sections in each company were designated as “assault” units and carried the special weapons and equipment characteristic of the first wave. The assault sections had the mission of mopping up enemy emplacements bypassed by the first wave. The other four boat sections had the ordinary equipment of rifle units. Page 50 On the assumption that the first penetrations would already be made, support units were under orders to proceed as quickly as possible inland, by boat sections, toward battalion assembly areas. In the 16th Infantry, the support battalion (1st) was organized in assault sections exactly like those of the first wave; this arrangement may have reflected the experience of that regiment in its previous landings in Africa and Sicily, where plans had never worked out according to schedule. In the 116th zone three companies of the 1st BLT were scheduled to land in reinforcement of Company A on Dog Green, facing the Vierville exit. In all, only two or three boat sections from these units landed on Dog Green. Company B was due in at 0700. Its craft failed to pick up landmarks, scattered badly, and beached on a front of nearly a mile to both sides of the target area. Only three scattered sections on the flanks were to play much part in the later battle. The craft which touched down on or near Dog Green came under the same destructive fire which had wrecked Company A, and the remnants of the boat sections mingled with those of Company A in an effort for survival at the water's edge. Company C came in at 0710 a thousand yards east of the Vierville exit, on Dog White, in a mislanding that was to work out to ultimate advantage. One of its 6 craft ran into a mined obstacle, and was delayed 20 minutes in maneuvers to get free without setting off the mines. The others came in fairly close together, suffering only one mishap when a craft thrown by the surf against a ramp turned over on its side, spilling men and equipment into water four to five feet deep. This boat section had been equipped for mopping-up work at the Vierville draw, and all its flamethrowers, demolition charges, bangalores, and mortars were lost. Enemy fire was surprisingly light, possibly because Company C was near the western end of the belt of smoke coming from grass fires on the bluff slopes. Only five or six casualties were suffered in disembarking and getting across the open sand. No other troops were near them; only four or five tanks were in sight. Bunched together on a front of about a hundred yards, Company C's men took shelter behind the four-foot timber sea wall and reorganized. Most of their equipment was intact, their sections were well together, and they were in relatively better shape for action than any unit so far landed in the 116th's zone. Company D was not so fortunate. Three of its craft were in serious trouble as a result of shipping water; one of these was abandoned far out, and the section got in after noon. Another craft was sunk by a mine or an artillery hit 400 yards from shore, forcing the men to swim in under a barrage of mortar shells and machine-gun bullets. Half the personnel reached the sands. A third section was debarked 150 yards from the water's edge, saw riflemen ahead of them staying in the water, and followed their example, hiding behind obstacles. It was nearly two hours before the scattered survivors got to shore, with one mortar and no ammunition. The second platoon arrived on the beach with only two machine guns, one mortar and a small amount of ammunition. The first platoon got one machine gun and one mortar ashore during the morning. The heavy weapons of the 1st BLT were to take little part in the beach assault. To complete the picture of misfortune for the 1st BLT, the three craft carrying the Headquarters Company, the command group, and the Beachmaster's party for Dog Green were brought in several hundred yards west of that sector and under the cliffs. Headquarters Company lost heavily among Page 51 officers and noncommissioned officers, including the commanding officer of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. The crossing of the tidal flat to the cliff against concentrated small-arms fire cost one-half to two-thirds of the group. The survivors, reaching the base of the cliffs, took refuge in niches in the rock. Not only was the command group separated from all other battalion units, but the members of the group were so scattered that they had to use radio for inter-communication. Sniper fire from the cliffs was to pin the group here for most of the day. Three companies of the 2d BLT had landed in the first wave. Completing the BLT, Company H got in at 0700, but in condition to furnish very little supporting fire for the rifle units. The 1st Machine-Gun Platoon and two mortar sections beached on Easy Red, where they helped the 18th RCT later in the morning. Other elements, landing on Dog Red and Easy Green, suffered heavy losses, one boat section getting only six men to the shingle. Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company came in on Dog Red at 0700. When the ramps went down, fire was so heavy that many men took refuge behind some tanks at the water's edge, only to find them favorite targets for artillery fire. Maj. Sidney V. Bingham, Jr., Battalion Commander, was among the first to reach the shingle, where he set to work trying to revive leaderless sections of Company F. For nearly an hour he had no radio working to contact the widely scattered elements of his battalion. During this period, the only part of the 2d BLT which had arrived at the embankment in good condition, four sections of Company G, set out to reach their planned assault sector on Dog White. To do so meant a lateral movement of several hundred yards behind the now crowded shingle bank and under small-arms fire. Starting out together and working slowly west, the four sections gradually lost all cohesion. One Page 52 after another, individuals or small groups stopped to take cover, and sections became mixed or separated. Only remnants were to reach Dog White, about 0830, after the main action on that sector was over. Major Bingham's attempts to organize an assault at les Moulins were unsuccessful. He managed to get about 50 men of Company F across the shingle near the prominent three-story house at the mouth of the draw (see illustration, p. 12); a good system of trenches had been dug near the house and gave cover for the group. But their rifles, clogged with sand, failed to function well enough to build up any volume of fire. Although Bingham led a group of 10 men nearly to the top of the bluff just east of D-3 draw, they were unable to knock out an enemy machine- gun nest and had to return to the house. The 3d BLT of the 116th was scheduled to land at 0720-0730 behind the 2d BLT, on Dog White, Dog Red, and Easy Green. Five to ten minutes late, the entire battalion came in to the east of les Moulins, with some elements on the edge of Easy Red. [12] Only a handful of assault troops from the first wave had come in between D-3 and E-1 draws: two or three scattered sections of G and the headquarters boat of Company E, which touched down at 0700 right on the target to find no trace of the E assault sections. Now, in contrast, this thousand-yard stretch was comparatively crowded, although there were gaps enough to give many boat teams the impression of being isolated. The craft of Companies K and I came in well bunched on the right wing. Enemy small-arms fire was light; K had no losses crossing the tidal flat to the shingle, and I took only a few casualties. Nevertheless, the men tended to become immobilized after reaching shelter, and reorganization of the boat teams was delayed by the fact that sections of different units had landed on top of each other. Company L came in midway between the draws, its craft rather scattered, and enemy fire was so light and ineffective that some of the troops had been several minutes on the open sand before they became aware of machine-gun fire. Company M's boat sections were still further east, on Easy Red, one craft arriving in sinking condition from a mine explosion which wounded three men. The troops were tired and cramped by the trip in, and found their loads of weapons and ammunition heavy to get across the sand. As one of them put it: “The burdens we ordinarily carried, we had to drag.” Enemy fire was more intense on this stretch of beach, near the E-1 strong-points, and the sections hesitated near the water's edge, taking shelter behind obstacles. Machine-gun bullets were kicking up the sand ahead; some of the men, after studying the beaten ones, decided that the enemy guns were delivering fixed fire and figured out routes for avoiding the ones. When the tide began to push them forward, the company made the move to the embankment as a body. Only a few were hit; said one survivor, “The company learned with surprise how much small- arms fire a man can run through without getting hit." Eighteen LCA's, carrying the 5th Ranger Battalion and Companies A and B of he 2d Rangers, had been waiting in the assembly area for word of the assault on Pointe du Hoe. One LCA had already been swamped further out, its men transferring to a passing LCT. After delaying 15 minutes beyond the time limit (0700), the Rangers still had no word and were forced to conclude that the assault had not succeeded. According to plan, they started in toward Dog Green to land behind the 1st Battalion of the 116th and go inland through the Vierville exit. [12] In the case of one company, according to Navy reports, the company commander gave orders which were responsible for the landing eastward. Page 53 Approaching shore, Lt. Col. Max F. Schneider got a clear impression of the conditions on Dog Green and ordered the flotilla to swing east. Even so, Companies A and B of the 2d Rangers, on the right flank, came in on the edge of Dog Green and experienced what the 1st BLT of the 116th had already been through. One of their 5 craft was sunk by a mine in the outer obstacles, and the 34 men had to swim in under fire. Small-arms and mortar fire caught the other craft as they touched down. The small Ranger companies numbered about 65 officers and men each; some 35 in Company A and 27 in Company B got to the sea wall. Only a few hundred yards further east, on the favored section of Dog White, 13 out of the 14 craft carrying the 5th Battalion touched down close together, in two waves. LCI 91 was struck and set afire while the Rangers were passing through the obstacles beside it, but none of their craft was hit. The 450 men of the battalion got across the beach and up to the sea wall with a loss of only 5 or 6 men to scattered small-arms fire. They found the sea-wall shelter already fully occupied by 116th troops, and crowded in behind them. By and large, the later waves of assault infantry on the western beaches had fared much better than in the first landings. Five of the eight companies of the 116th RCT had landed with sections well together and losses relatively light. Some had been shielded by the smoke of burning grass, but the better fortune was probably due also to the fact that, as landings increased in volume, enemy positions still in action were not able to concentrate on the many targets offered. By 0730, in contrast to the earlier situation, assault units were lined along the whole beach front in the 116th's one. The weakest area was in front of Exit D-l; Dog Green, the one of the 1st BLT, had almost no assault elements on it capable of further action. Beginning at 0730, regimental command parties began to arrive. The main command group of the 116th RCT included Col. Charles D. W. Canham and General Cota. LCVP 71 came in on Dog White, bumping an obstacle and nudging the Teller mine until it dropped off, without exploding. Landing in three feet of water, the party lost one officer in getting across the exposed area. From the standpoint of influencing further operations, they could not have hit a better point in the 116th one. To their right and left, Company C and some 2d Battalion elements were crowded against the embankment on a front of a few hundred yards, the main Ranger force was about to come into the same area, and enemy fire from the bluffs just ahead was masked by smoke and ineffective. The command group was well located to play a major role in the next phase of action. The Later Assault Waves: 16th RCT The first-wave landings of this combat team had veered so consistently eastward that Easy Red, longest of the beach sectors, had only a handful of assault infantry on it at 0700. The situation was largely corrected in the next 45 minutes by landings that concentrated between exit draws E-1 and E-3 (Map No. VI), where most of the surviving 741st tanks were available for support. Company G beached on its target area at 0700, all craft together except for one delayed by shipping water. Some artillery shells hit near as they came close to touchdown, but there were no casualties before debarking. The craft were handled well; one of them hit a sandbar several hundred yards out, but the coxswain bumped his way through and made shallow water. Engineers were still at work on the obstacles as Company G passed through, and three Page 54 DD tanks on the sand were already disabled by enemy fire. The short passage from ramps to shingle bank was costly for the company; most of its 63 casualties for D Day came here, from small-arms and mortar fire. There was no way to avoid these losses; the men were cramped by the trip in, were heavily loaded, and had to make the distance at a walking pace. Nevertheless, the sections were well together and reached the shingle without being disorganized. In 15 minutes the supporting weapons were set up and were engaging enemy emplacements as soon as these could be spotted by their fire on later landings. Company G's men had come in almost on top of three sections left on the beach by the first wave, one from Company E and two from Company E of the 116th RCT. Company H, due in on the same beach at 0710, was delayed in contacting the Navy control boat. Landing 20 minutes late a few hundred yards left of Company G, it lost a good deal of equipment including all radios in getting to the embankment. There, on a stretch facing E-3 draw where few troops had landed and enemy fire was heavy, the company was immobilized for the next few hours. The 1st BLT, scheduled to reinforce and support the first assault units, came in on time about 0740 to 0800, between E-1 and E-3 draws, with Companies A and B on the right. Company D was boated so that its machine-gun sections came in attached to the rifle companies, and the heavy mortars with battalion headquarters. As far as incomplete evidence shows, casualties were much less heavy than in earlier landings. Fox Green Beach already had elements of five companies, sections separated and scrambled (except for Company L) as a result of first-wave landings. Company K, arriving at 0700, added further to the mixture with sections bunching in two main groups that were not in contact until some hours later. That company took most of its 53 casualties for the day on the beach, including 4 officers. Company M's craft came in scattered, from 0730 to 0800. One capsized some distance from shore; the others, unloading in deep water and under fire, nevertheless got enough of their equipment ashore in time to be ready for effective support to the rifle units. Company I, scheduled in the first assault wave, had gone o course to the east, lost two boats swamped, and finally came in to Fox Green about 0800. The four craft suffered heavily in the last yards of their approach. The command party craft struck a mine and was set afire by machine-gun bullets, two others received artillery hits (or struck mines), and the fourth was hung up on an obstacle, under machine-gun fire. Casualties were heavy. Captain Richmond, on landing safely, found himself senior officer on Fox Green and in charge of the intermingled elements of the 3d BLT on that beach. The command party of the battalion had been mislanded, this time to the west, and was unable to rejoin for hours. Conditions on the Beach: 0730-0800 Infantry units were not the only assault elements to come ashore in the period from 0700 to 0800. The 81st Chemical Weapons Battalion, combat engineer battalions, advance elements of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, naval shore fire control parties, advance elements of artillery units, medical detachments, and antiaircraft units were included in the landings before 0800, and artillery was due to start landing during the next hour. Mislandings of these elements operated, as they had with the infantry, to snarl the assault plans. Engineer units with special assignments to carry Page 55 out in clearing exits or marking beaches found themselves hundreds or even thousands of yards away from the targets, sometimes separated from their equipment or losing it in the debarkment. An engineer unit with panels for marking Dog Red Beach landed on Easy Red, over a mile away; they set up their panels anyway. About 0830 an officer on Dog White noticed two engineers making slow progress as they lugged a heavy box of explosives along the open beach behind the sea wall. As they stopped to rest, one of them wiped the sweat off his face and asked, "Where are we? We are supposed to blow something up down toward Vierville.” They picked up the box and moved along toward the hottest section of the beach. Navigational difficulties in landing increased as the tide advanced into and past the obstacles. On most of the beaches no gaps had been cleared. Landing craft, including now the larger LCI's and LST's, had to find a way through and avoid the mines affixed to the timbers. Some craft bumped on sandbars in the middle of obstacles and hurried to drop their ramps in deep water; others maneuvered somehow through the surf and got all the way in. There are not many recorded instances of craft sunk by the obstacles before getting their troops off, though on LCA 853 half of the 116th's boat team was killed by a mine explosion. However, crippling damage was inflicted on many craft, often in their efforts to retract after touchdown, or as a result of enemy artillery and mortar hits while the craft were delayed in the obstacles. Only a few were destroyed by this fire, but enough to make a vivid and discouraging impression on the men watching from the shelter of the embankment. One of the spectacular disasters of the day was suffered by LCI 91, approaching Dog White about 0740 and carrying the alternate headquarters of the 116th RCT. Handled Page 56 by a veteran crew with experience at Sicily and Salerno, the LCI was struck by artillery fire as it made a first attempt to get through the obstacles. Backing out, the craft came in again for a second try. Element “C” was barely showing above the rising tide, and the LCI could not get past. The ramps were dropped in six feet of water. As some officers led the way off, an artillery shell (or rocket) hit the crowded forward deck and sent up a sheet of flame. Clothes burning, men jumped or fell off into the sea and tried to swim in under continued artillery fire. It is estimated that no personnel escaped from No. 1 compartment of the craft out of the 25 carried there. [13] A few minutes later LCI 92 came into the same sector and suffered almost the same fate, an underwater explosion setting off the fuel tanks. The two craft burned for hours. Much of the artillery fire at this end of the beach was coming from the enemy gun positions toward Pointe de la Percee. The tanks had been given those flank positions as a priority target, but they found themselves fully occupied by enemy strongpoints in front of the landings. At the other end of the beach, LCI 85 came in to Fo