Jacobs, Michael. 1995. "Sustainable Development, Capital Substitution and Economic Humility: A Response to Beckerman." Environmental Values 4(1995): 57-68.

Thesis:

Jacobs responds to Wilfred Beckerman's critique of sustainable development (1994) by (1) defending strong sustainability, based upon Daly's argument that natural capital and human capital are complements, not substitutes, and thus discounting does not adequately address the ecological needs of future generations; (2) rejecting 'weak sustainability' as sustainable at all; (3) arguing for welfare pluralism, rather than trying to encompass 'welfare' under one value; and finally (4) upholding sustainable development as a useful and ethical concept.

Summary:

Beckerman argues that sustainability is an unnecessary concept because the welfare of future generations is already accounted for in the concept of optimality through discounting. This argument, Jacobs says, rests upon the critical assumption that natural capital and human capital are infinitely substitutable. Jacobs draws upon Daly's work on human and natural capital as complements, not substitutes to reject this assumption. Without this assumption, the case for discounting collapses, because it will then "not be possible to compare the 'returns' of financial investments with those from environmental investments" (p.59). While economic growth may make future generations better off financially, this does not address issues of sustainable development that ensure that people will be better off environmentally, since natural resource stocks are declining. (pp.58-60)

Turning to the concept of 'weak sustainability', Jacobs joins with Beckerman in repudiating it. Jacobs rejects it on the grounds of its assumption of substitutability of natural capital and human capital, and the lumping of all aspects of welfare into one value (pp.60, 61).

Jacobs holds that Beckerman's use of 'optimality' does not adequately address the concerns of welfare, because "human beings need a variety of different kinds of goods, services, experiences and relationships in order to achieve wellbeing"(p.64). 'Strong sustainability' rests upon a belief in welfare pluralism. Sustainability is concerned with the "connection between needs-based welfare pluralism and the non-commensurability of public policy objectives" (p.65). This involves denying "orthodox economic rationality -- the idea that the aim both of individual and social choice is to maximise a single welfare value" (ibid.).

Beckerman has rejected 'strong sustainability' because of its impractical and "fuzzy" 'requirement to preserve intact the environment as we find it today in all its forms'(Beckerman, p.94). Jacobs responds that this has never been the aim of sustainable development. Rather, it is to maintain the capacities of the natural environment to provide the services of resource provision, waste absorption, and life support. Working out the specifics of this goal is the aim of policy formulation. (p.62)

Beckerman's second reason to reject 'strong sustainability' is that it is ethically unacceptable. He argues that sustainability requires us to choose between directing funds to save a species of beetles or to provide sanitary water for the poor. Jacobs responds simply that (1) it is true that the concept itself does not provide specific guidelines for making choices between environmental conflicts; (2) sustainability is not the only ethical principle espoused by its advocates, and most are able to invoke other ethical principles such as intragenerational equity in making choices; and (3) that in practice, we probably will not have to make such a bi-polar choice, and we could always redirect funds from something like arms in order to support both environmental needs. (pp.62-63).

Finally, Jacobs turns to Beckerman's charge that sustainability is not a useful concept for economists. First, he reminds us that the term originated as an ethico-political objective, not an economic concept. Secondly, it has been useful in drawing attention to the issues of environmental degradation and poverty in the South, overconsumptive lifestyles in the North, and an "unprecedented level of at least rhetorical political commitment to the environment" (p.65). He argues that the fact that the practical implications of sustainability are open to debate and need definition, does not diminish its usefulness as a concept any more than does the vagueness of 'democracy' as a concept. It provides key principles that can be negotiated into operational policy terms (p.66).

Keywords: complementarity, discounting, natural capital, 'strong sustainability', welfare pluralism